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ABSTRACTS 
Leadership transition is a critical period for any organizations. By researching 
finns in the FTSE All-Share Index, this thesis offers three empirical studies to explore 
some interesting problems in this important epoch. The samples used for the research are 
those companies that changed their CEOs in a six-year (from 2002 to 2007) window. This 
study identified the importance of CEOs' psychological factors not only for the 
predecessors but also for the new leaders. The first study looks at the old CEOs before the 
CEO turnover; the second and third studies follow the new CEOs longitudinally after the 
succession. 
The first essay investigates how old CEOs' psychological factors influence their 
types of departure, i.e. voluntary and involuntary CEO turnovers. This study integrates 
both cognitive and emotional factors, appreciating the proactive roles of CEOs in the 
leadership succession process. Apart from conventional reasons, e.g. firms' prior 
perfonnance, old CEOs' power, their future focus attention (FF A) and negative emotion 
(NE) provide crucial explanations determining the turnover types. Empirically, this study 
identifies that the level of CEOs' FF A, signaling the planned career management 
behaviors, will increase the likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover. I also found that the 
level of CEOs' NE, reflecting the uncooperative behaviors, will increase the likelihood of 
involuntary CEO turnover. 
The second essay studies how new CEOs' psychological factors influence the post 
succession strategic changes (PSSC) of firms. Using the trilogy of mind perspective, on 
top of cognition, I advocate that new CEOs' emotion and conation serve as the impetus for 
the PSSC. By tracing the identical new CEOs over years after their succession, the 
empirical results of this longitudinal study demonstrate that those intra-individual 
psychological (time-varying) factors of new CEOs are important for the PSSc. New CEOs' 
future focus attention (FF A), commitment to change (C2C) will significantly increase the 
PSSC and new CEOs' negative emotion (NE) will significantly reduce the PSSC. 
Based on the cognitive continuum theory (CCT), the third research study 
advocates that new CEOs' cognitive reasoning provides new explanations for the 
mechanism behind the cash holding phenomenon. It is down to CEOs to appreciate the 
needs and the associated risks. I identify that the degree of analysis (DoA) in new CEOs' 
cognitive continuum will increase firms' cash holding level because DoA tends to raise 
the calculated transaction costs, the management controls, the uncertainty avoidance 
behaviors and the opportunity costs. 
Using a psycholinguistic approach and computer-aided text analysis (CATA) 
technique, directly measuring CEOs' mind, we expect to explore the "black box" ofCEOs' 
roles comprehensively in the leadership succession period. 
Key words: CEO turnover, succession, cognition, emotion, conation, analysis, intuition, 
cognitive continuum, FFA, NE, C2C, CCT, DoA, PSSC, CATA 
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Chapter 1. Introduction to the research 
1.1. Research purpose & rationale 
The history of top executive studies can be tracked back to the early years of the 20th 
century (Barnard, 1938). Even in the embryo of strategic management research, scholars 
had already started to know that "strategy is a human construction" «Andrews, 1971), 
p.l07), particularly as a human construction of managers. The popularity of research on 
top executives is self-evident. It is an eye catching domain and generates much interest for 
external people such as stakeholders, investors, the media and the general public. Top 
executives can greatly influence what happens to organizations and to themselves, 
whether good or bad (Finkelstein et aI., 2009), for example, Jack Welch at GE, Jilrgen 
Schrempp at Daimler-Benz and so on. Under ambiguity, uncertainty and complexity, 
individuals inject a great deal of themselves into their decisions (Barsade, 2002, Amabile 
et aI., 2005, Baron, 2008). Therefore, apart from objective contextual factors such as 
environments, competition and company resources, those subjective human factors, for 
instance, the biases and dispositions of top managers do matter under uncertainty. Their 
personalities, experiences, values, social connections, fatigue and envy will have impacts 
on the decisions and organizational outcomes. 
This thesis looks at chief executive officer (CEO) succession as the vital event in 
studying top executives. Leadership transition evokes hope, fear, and anxiety for 
organizations and stakeholders (Finkelstein et aI., 2009, Kesner and Sebora, 1994, Rowe 
and Cannella, 2005, Giambatista et aI., 2005). This thesis investigates the antecedents of 
CEO departure types and the stories after. It attempts to address two main general 
questions ("why?" and "so what?"); more specifically, why old CEO (incumbents) 
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psychological factors lead to different types of turnover and what the post succession 
implications are caused by new CEO (successors) psychological factors. 
Inseparable from strategic management studies, CEO succession research is rooted in 
objective, rational and economic approaches. The title of CEO gives a manager the 
ultimate legal authority, power, and responsibility in the corporate hierarchy (Zhang and 
Rajagopalan, 2003). From a "variable human" perspective (Finkelstein et aI., 2009), the 
roles of "soft", subjective human differences should be taken in to account, for im;tance, 
biases, egos, aptitudes, experiences and others. Psychological factors, i.e. the thoughts, 
feelings, attitudes, or other cognitive or affective characteristics of an individual will 
influence hislher behavior. They are the fundamental differences representing human 
mental functions and behaviors. Similar to the status of research in psychology, current 
strategic management literature ignores the "hot" elements of people such as emotion and 
intentions. From a different zoom lens, we are able to explore the effects of these ignored 
psychological factors in the models of the CEO succession studies. 
"Words allow people to convey and interpret meaning, hence potentially to influence 
perceptions, emotions, attitudes, decisions and associated behaviour"(Shapiro, 2014). The 
topic of this thesis is "the power of words" which is also the theme of the 74th Academy 
of Management (AoM) Annual Meeting 2014. Language is a system of visual and/or 
vocal symbols which contain meaning to the user and to the recipient(Harley, 2013). 
Psycholinguistics is to study verbal behaviour investigate the role of human psychology in 
language acquisition and comprehension (Carlson et aI., 2009). Using the psycholinguistic 
content analysis approach, this research study extracts CEO psychological factors and 
helps to explore the knowledge of how top executives can leverage the power in words to 
bring some positive changes to both the organizations and themselves. 
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1.2. Summary of research 
This thesis contains three independent essays reported in Chapter 3, 4 and 5. The 
main focus is the importance of CEOs' psychological factors for their decisions and the 
finns' strategies. The first essay will apply a traditional functional localization view of 
brain into the research of old CEOs' turnover (Pessoa, 2008). The second essay will 
extend the trilogy of psychology theory (Hilgard, 1980) to investigate post succession 
strategic change. The third essay will take a cognitive continuum theory (Ohami and 
Thomson, 20l3) to study CEOs' cash holding behavior .Essay one and Essay two have 
been peer-reviewed and accepted by the 74th AoM annual meeting 2014; Essay three also 
has been peer-reviewed and accepted by the 34th Strategic Management Society (SMS) 
Annual International Conference 2014. Figure 1.1 outlines the rationale and main points 
of these three empirical studies. 
Figure 1.1: An overview of three empirical studies 
Essay 1: Voluntary and Essay 2: New CEOs' minds Essay 3: New CEOs & 
Involuntary CEO turnovers and post succession strategic cash holding policies 
,.-_____ ...... -.-.- ._._. ___ ._ ._._. ___ ._ ._. _._ '£'!~!'I.~j~_~~l._. _. ___ . _ ._. _._ ._._._ ._._. ___ ._ ._._.--_.- .-. 
Theoretical gaps & . Ignored proactive roles of old I New CEOs' non-cognition i Attempts to open the 
motivations . CEOs; career management i psychological factors are : "black box" of CEDs' 
: perspectives; neglected \ ignored; the intra-individual ! bounded rationality 
· emotional components in the I (time-varying) differences I decisions of cash holding 
: judgment systems i are neglected. i 
I-o-rg-a-n-iz-at-io-n-a-I --,"""oid CEOs' psychological - -:j A'part'from' external ca~ses;" I Firms holding different 
phenomenal : factors are supposed as I successors' psychological I levels of cash is due to 
assumptions . additional antecedences of I factors are assumed as the I the degree of analysis 
· the CEO turnover type. i internal causes of PSSc. I (DOA.) ~f new CE?S' J----:----:'-~. - -_. ..... ... ·_1 ..... ........ ~.C:~"-Itlve~ea~~._ 
Object of study Pr~~ec~~sor.~ (ol~ CE:Qs ) .. I Successors (new CEDs) I Successors (new CEDs) r,=,,;;,-:-,-,--.L--~ - -j ••• - .. ' ••... ... •. .. t· .. ·· __ ·_-_···_· __ .. _· 




: Attention (FFA); negative I commitment to change (C2C) I cognitive continuum 
· emotion (NE) I I 
· Psycholinguistic content 
: analysis, logit regressions 
I I 
I Psycholinguistic content 
, analysis, exponential 
I smoothing, fixed effects 
modelling. 
: Content analysis, quartile 
, comparisons, system 
Generalized Method Of 
Moments (GMM) 
_ dynilr:nicr:nodellins_ _ 
Both FFA and NE will i Internal factors, such as FFA, I DoA provides new 
influence the CEO succession ,NE and C2C will influence the ' insights about the trade-
type. I magnitude of PSCc. I off in cash holding level 
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1.2.1. Why do predecessors (old CEOs) step down from different routes? 
The first essay, entitled CEOs' psychological factors and CEO turnover types, is 
motivated by three reasons in studying types of CEO turnover. Current literature treats old 
CEOs as passive players in the process of leadership transition. The first motivation is to 
refocus on old CEOs' initiatives because whether a succession is involuntary or voluntary 
depends on their own will. I argue that on top of those conventional factors, i.e. firms' 
prior performance and old CEOs' power, their psychological factors may have some extra 
impact on the types of succession. The second reason for this study is to incorporate a 
career management perspective into the CEO transition process. The third motivation 
comes from the deficiency in research of top executives' emotions as an ignored factor in 
the fields of strategic management and psychology. 
Much existing empirical literature has a problem of correctly categorizing two 
different types of CEO turnover (Hilger et aI., 2012, Giambatista et aI., 2005). To 
investigate this phenomenon, this study uses some appropriate methods to classify the 
difference. The study object is the predecessors, in other words, the old CEOs of the 
companies. Psychological factors here are those distinctive cognitive and emotional 
elements of CEOs' mind. The focal constructs (independent variables) are old CEOs' FF A 
and NE. These explanatory variables were generated from predefined psycholinguistic 
content analysis software, Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC). The logit 
regression method was adopted to explain the dichotomous dependent variable of CEO 
turnover type, i.e. involuntary versus voluntary departures. 
Empirical results illustrate that CEO turnover types are not only influenced by 
external factors, but also internally by old CEOs' psychological factors. The likelihood of 
voluntary turnover is positively related to the old CEOs' FFA because future focused 
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CEOs are better in managing their future career prosperity and arranging succession 
planning for their companies. On the other hand, the research found that the level of old 
CEOs' NE increases the likelihood of CEO involuntary turnover because it represents the 
uncooperative behaviors between old CEOs and the board of directors (BoDs). 
1.2.2. Successors' mind and PSSC 
The second essay, entitled The impacts of new CEOs' psychological factors on 
post-succession strategic change, is to address two gaps in the PSSC literature. First, 
similar to the discussion above on essay one, existing literature in PSSC studies has 
ignored those non-cognition factors, i.e. emotion and intention of managers' minds; this 
study will incorporate these neglected factors to provide a better explanation for PSSC. 
Second, this research is not to compare the strategic differences between pre and post 
succession; rather, this study looks at the influences of intra-individual (time-varying) 
differences of new CEOs' psychology on strategic change in a longitudinal setting. 
In the second essay, the object of study is the successors (the new CEOs). 
Explanatory variables, i.e. new CEOs' FFA, NE C2C, were extracted from computer-
aided text analysis (CATA). This essay looks at the variation of PSSC and applies 
exponent smoothing methods to gauge the changes from different angles. Focusing on 
those internal causes, this longitudinal study investigates the intra-individual (time-
varying) differences of new CEOs' psychology rather than the differences in the 
psychology between predecessors and successors. The empirical observations on the 
trilogy ofCEOs' psychology (i.e. cognition, emotion and conation (Hilgard, 1980, Piderit, 
2000») provide strong evidence on the positive effects of FFA, C2C and negative effects 
of NE on the variation of PSSC, both in each effect individually and in the integrated 
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effects simultaneously. This study illustrates that including these neglected elements of 
CEOs' psychology, the explanatory power will be enhanced dramatically. 
1.2.3. King and sting, new CEOs' cash holding strategies 
The title of the third paper is The degree of analysis (DoA) of new CEOs' cognitive 
reasoning andfirms' cash holding. Leadership transition is a risky process (Giambatista et 
aI., 2005), (Rowe and Cannella, 2005). The motivation of the third essay is to open the 
"black box" of successors' bounded rationality decisions in cash holding, as one of the 
most important issues for the new leaders in this risky period. 
Current research in cash holding is mainly based on the economic rationales. A 
small number of studies have begun to be aware of the importance in leadership (Orens 
and Reheul, 2013); those CEO demographic characteristics are proxies. However, I 
believe that cash holding is a dynamic partial adjustment process so that these static 
characteristic proxies have little explanatory power in this context. This research proposes 
that firms' cash holding level depends on how new CEOs use different DoA in their 
cognitive continuum to understand and interpret the needs and risks of holding cash, 
whereas the majority of researchers in behavior finance have been preoccupied by the high 
DoA in cognition and its advantages. This study suggests that taking account of the DoA, 
in particular intuition, i.e. cognition with a low DoA, will add stronger explanatory power 
for their cash holding policies. 
The object of this study is the new CEOs; the focal construct (independent variable) 
is the DoA as the measure of CEOs' cognitive reasoning which lies on the continuum 
between analysis and intuition (Hammond, 1996). This study adopted the CAT A approach 
to measure DoA and used the system GMM dynamic modelling to address the nature of a 
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partial adjustment process. These direct measurements increase our understanding of the 
psychological mechanism behind cash holding decisions. 
This study discovers that a primarily analytic DoA may increase the estimated 
transactional costs of raising funds, diminish fast-moving competitive advantages, and 
increase the related opportunity costs. It makes the CEOs more precautionary and more 
risk adverse. Consequently, it raises the cash holding levels. Empirically, results provide 
strong evidence about the effects of DoA on the cash holding level under different 
scenarios. 
To sum up, these three independent studies presented in this thesis test, deepen and 
expand our understanding of the effects of CEOs' psychological factors on their decisions 
and organizational behaviors. Modestly, the contributions of these studies mainly embody 
in explanation rather prediction. 
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1.3. The structure ofthis thesis 
There are six chapters in the thesis: 
I) The introductory chapter offers an outline of the thesis. It summarizes the 
motivations, methods and main points from three empirical studies. 
2) The second chapter provides a general review of the background knowledge and 
the research setting. It discusses the roles of CEOs in a corporate hierarchy; the 
"hard & soft", "hot & cold" aspects in strategic management studies from different 
angles. It justifies the appropriateness of our research philosophy, sampling 
strategy and content analysis methodology. 
3) The third chapter is an essay exploring the relationships between old CEOs' 
psychological factors and different CEO turnover types. It will develop a model 
which takes into consideration of the initiatives of old CEOs' proactive roles. 
4) Chapter Four is the second essay, examining the effects of successors' 
psychological states from the trilogy of mind on the PSSC. 
5) Chapter Five, the third essay, investigates the psychological mechanism of new 
CEOs behind the cash holding decision. It examines how new CEOs' cognitive 
approach serves as an alternative trade-off explanation complementing current 
economic rational reasoning. 
6) The final chapter synthesizes the findings from three empirical research studies. It 
discusses the contributions and the practical implications of this thesis. It debates 
the limitations of these studies and future research potential of this thesis. It also 
reflects on the importance of CEOs' psychological factors in the leadership 
succession epoch and in other arenas. 
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Chapter 2. A synthesis of the background knowledge and research 
settings 
This chapter synthesizes the general information and background knowledge of 
this thesis. It argues the importance of CEOs in strategic management, particularly the 
importance of CEOs' psychology in the leadership transition process. It briefly introduces 
the research settings and the nature of the Financial Times and London Stock Exchange 
(FTSE) index companies. This chapter illustrates the research philosophy, sampling 
strategies and the data collection procedures adopted by this thesis. It intends to lay a solid 
foundation for the following essay chapters. Details about the raw data, analysis 
approaches and the processing techniques will be also discussed here to justify their 
appropriateness. 
2.1. CEO position in a corporate hierarchy & CEO succession 
A CEO is the highest ranking manager in charge of the total management of a 
company. He/she normally needs to report to the BoDs, a body of elected and appointed 
members who jointly oversee the activities and performance of an organization. For a 
listed company, members of the BoDs are normally elected by stockholders. The chairman 
is the head of the board. A BoDs is a governance mechanism that regulates but is not 
directly involved in the actual management of the firm. It plays a key role in selecting 
appropriate executives, setting up executive compensation schemes and monitoring their 
performance. BoDs define the general policies representing the shareholders' values and 
rights. A top management team (TMT) is a team of senior executives who collectively 
formulate, articulate and execute the strategic and tactical moves of the organization. An 
organization is the reflection of their TMT (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). However, I 
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believe that CEOs are the most important key decision-makers among those people 
mentioned above that can be set as the unit of analysis. Members of the TMT, often even 
members of BoDs, are recommended or selected by the CEOs. Strategically, CEOs 
identify the goals and purposes and make strategic choices for the companies (Child, 
1972); operationally, CEOs are responsible for the effectiveness and efficiency of their 
firm's day to day management. 
To change a CEO is a critical decision for any company. CEO succession is an 
important, unique and very visible event (Kesner and Sebora, 1994) that often has 
profound impacts on the organization, for example, igniting other TMT members change 
and leading to strategic reorientation (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2003). Although I 
acknowledge the importance of the TMT (Kesner and Dalton, 1994), a CEO is the agent 
ultimately responsible and accountable for actions on and reactions to the firm's strategy, 
design and performance. The CEO title gives an individual the ultimate legal authority, 
power and responsibility in the corporate hierarchy (Datta et ai., 2003). In a leadership 
transition context, the incumbent (old CEO) is replaced by the successor (new CEO). This 
process is the most pervasive management change. Internally, more or less, every 
member in the organization will experience some effect during this period; externally, 
those such as suppliers, customers, competitors, societies and governments will observe 
the succession events and the characteristics of new CEOs to foretell the firms' future 
destiny. 
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2.2. Hard & soft, hot & cold, the importance of psychology in studying CEO 
succession 
2.2.1. Hard & Soft 
Dominant theories in strategic management such as the resource based view, 
transaction cost theory are "hard" theories which are deeply rooted in economic and 
rational foundations. Other sociological theorists look at human interactions and take into 
consideration the learning and dynamic capabilities in organizations. More and more, the 
importance of decision-makers have been discussed in theories such as upper echelon 
theory (UET) (Hambrick, 2007) and attention based view (ABV) (Ocasio, 2011). 
According to the American Psychological Association (APA), psychology is the 
study of human's mental functions and behaviors. In the past two decades, scholars 
attempt to incorporate the insights of human psychology as the "soft" elements to refine 
the understanding of strategic issues such as the evolution of competitive industrial 
structures (Peteraf and Shanley, 1997, Porac et aI., 1995), the nature and sources of bias 
for investment decision (Schwenk, 1984). 
CEO succession has drawn much attention from the field of management studies. 
Scholars have conducted research to investigate the antecedents of CEO succession in 
which dependent variables are those of rate, probability and the likelihood of succession 
event; the consequences of CEO succession such as performance, compensation, strategies 
and reconstructing outcomes and so on are normally set as dependent variables 
(Giambatista et aI., 2005, Hutzschenreuter et aI., 2012, Colbert et aI., 2008). The 
importance of psychology in strategic leadership has appeared in the literature 
(Hodgkinson and Healey, 2011, Powell et aI., 2011, Weber and Johnson, 2009, Sarasvathy, 
2003). The ways CEOs manage their companies are influenced by their thoughts and 
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feelings (Hodgkinson and Healey, 2011, Rowe and Cannella, 2005). Therefore, in this 
thesis, I propose that incorporating CEOs' psychological factors will help us understand 
their influences in the leadership transition processes better. Taking into account these 
subjective (soft) factors of CEOs together with objective (hard) reasons, i.e. the economic 
rationale, we can improve our knowledge about firms' activities in this transition period. 
2.2.2. Cold vs. Hot 
Researchers tend to classify psychological factors into two categories: cognition 
and emotion (Szabla, 2007, Schwarz, 2000). Cognition and emotion are two fundamental 
components of human psychological activities to drive motivation systems, to mobilize 
resources, to enhance perceptual processing and to prepare for action (Bradley, 2008). 
Cognition refers to an information processing view of psychological functions. Emotion is 
the subjective, conscious experience (positive or negative) associated with a particular 
pattern of physiological activity (Forgas, 1995, Forgas and George, 2001). 
Cognition has been seen as rational, dispassionate and "cold", and emotion has 
been considered as irrational, passionate and "hot". In studying organizations, cognition 
and emotion are two crucial elements for people' attitudes to deal with dynamic 
challenges (Piderit, 2000). Although cognition is very important in psychology, 
particularly in representations and computations (Stubbart, 1989), it is not the only 
component of the human mind. Based on the information processing logic such as 
mathematic calculations and inference, cognitive psychology is too "cold" (Abelson and 
Clarke, 1963, Redlawsk, 2002). The wish is the father to the thought and we are slaves of 
our emotions (Damasio, 1994). Emotion will be either advancing (positive emotion) or 
hindering (negative emotion) an organism's explicit or implicit goals (Fischer et aI., 1990). 
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Cognition is a highly dominant topic in strategic management studies (Kaplan, 2011); 
(Walsh, 1995). Emotion had been ignored by much literature but it is becoming of more 
and more concern (SEO and Barrett, 2007, Liu and Maitlis, 2012, Rajah et aI., 2011). 
Thoughts and decisions are influenced by the affect and conation of the key decision-
makers. If we overemphasize a time primarily on cognition or emotion, the total 
experiences are subordinated, and the psychological reality is incomplete. Thus, I propose 
that if we can integrate more psychological elements together, we will have a better 
picture of the mechanism explaining many phenomena in strategic management. 
Therefore, for this thesis, I attempt to incorporate cognition, emotion and others to shed 
more light on the influences of CEOs on the leadership transition process. The reasons for 
me to select FF A from cognition and NE from emotion as two focal constructs are: 1) 
Because the future is unknown, future focus is to consider the most abstract time period 
(Shipp et aI., 2009), Therefore, FF A may strongly relate to need for cognition (Cacioppo 
and Petty, 1982), which makes it a relevant and interesting construct the context of CEO 
succession study. 2) Due to individuals will give high priority to consistency which in 
turn fosters the basic orientation that bad is stronger than good. According to Baumeister 
et aI.(2001)'s literature review, negative emotion has much stronger power over the 
positive one and has more impacts on individual's decision and behaviors. 
Furthermore, according to the Cognitive Continuum Theory (CCT) (Doherty and 
Kurz, 1996, Hammond, 1996), modes of cognition lie between the analysis and intuition 
continuum which depend on different degrees of analysis. Traditionally, strategic and 
financial decisions are dominated by a high DoA of cognitive reasoning. Managers are 
preoccupied by "hard" data (quantitative) which can be represented and calculated by 
complex computational models of risk, capital and credit (~upiec, 2002). However, more 
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and more researchers have identified the important role of intuition, i.e. low DoA 
cognition. For example, some credit decision interview studies (Lipshitz and Shulimovitz, 
2007) found when rating the credibility of loan applicants, loan officers integrate "hard" 
financial data with "soft" data from impressions and 'gut feelings'; they regarded feelings 
as more valid indicators of the applicants' credit worthiness than financial data (they are 
more used to impression information and give more credit to impression information). 
They even claim that relying on intuition may lead to better evaluation results and gain 
more creditworthiness than deliberation decisions. This thesis will explore the 
relationships between DoA in CEOs' cognition reasoning and firms' cash holding policies. 
However, applying more direct and closer measures seems to be unrealistic in the 
CEO population. CEOs are generally not willing or not available for interviews and are 
less likely to complete questionnaire by themselves (Bednar and Westphal, 2006). Using a 
proxy will face the challenges of validity and reliability issues. Measurement is one of the 
biggest obstructions hampering our progress in unveiling the "black box" of a manager's 
mind and decisions. Hence, this thesis attempts to adopt some novel approaches of 
psycho linguistic and content analysis to deal with these problems. 
2.3. The research setting - the FTSE index and UK list firms 
Existing CEO succession studies are mainly in the context of the United States of 
America (USA) because data can be more easily obtained by American researchers using 
sophisticated US emphasized data-sources such as COMPUSTAT, Dun & Bradstreet 
Database and Lexis and so on. I want to expand the research scope by looking at firms 
listed in the FTSE because I want to make some contextual contributions. There is a 
deficiency in CEO successi~n studies in the United Kingdom (UK). More than 2500 
companies currently trade on the London Stock Exchange, in which the top 600 
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companies with the highest market value comprise the FTSE All-Share Index.1 They were 
worth nearly £ 1.8 trillion in 2011 and represent 98% of the full capital value of all the UK 
listed firms? FTSE All-Share companies also account for 10% the world's equity market 
value. 
The constituents in the FTSE indices are reviewed regularly according to some 
transparent public set of rules by an independent committee. The FTSE publishes the 
notes of change annually from which we can identify those firms which have dropped out, 
i.e. a) some companies downgraded to the FTSE All-Small Index and b) some ceased 
trading due to being bankrupt or delisted for various reasons. 
2.4. The research philosophy, sample strategies and data collection 
procedure 
Philosophy is informing the process of social investigation and the way one thinks 
about the development of knowledge implicitly or explicitly (Denscombe, 2007). It also 
enhances the researchers' confidence about the appropriateness of their methodology to 
the research problems and then to the research results (Bryman and Bell, 2003). The 
purpose of this research is to understand the importance of CEOs' psychology in the 
leadership transition period, i.e. a) the relationships between old CEOs' psychological 
factors and turnover types; b) the impacts of new CEOs' psychological factors on the 
organizational consequences. The research philosophy underlying the current study is that 
of positivism, which is usually (but not exclusively) associated with quantitative methods 
of research aimed at establishing general laws describing human behavior from which 
1 More than 35% ofFTSE All-Share Index companies operate in the financial sectors. 
2 For more detail on the FTSE index family, please refer to Appendix I: the FTSE index family tree. 
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predictions can be made. It adopts hypothesis testing (research commences with 
questionable theories) and focuses on the individual CEO as the unit of analysis. 
To overcome the survival bias over the years, an approach suggested by Page and 
Abdullah (2009) is adopted to cover those downgraded, delisted and dead firms. In our 
study, the chosen companies are those memberships of the FTSE All-Share Index between 
two points of time: 3rd January 2002 to 3rd May 2011. A reverse selection strategy is 
adopted and first, I look at the FTSE All-Share constituents, 622 companies on 3rd May 
20 II and then add up all the dropped out firms according to the FTSE All-Share change 
notes from 3rd January 2002 to 3rd May 2011. The firms disappeared from the FTSE 
totaled 351 and 183 companies were downgraded to the FTSE All-Small Index during this 
timeframe. I then use the MS Excel filter function to retain the unique value of the 
company names because there are some overlaps among these three. At this stage, 
retrieved 1146 companies for the population of our study. 
Tracing these 1146 companies, I continued to retain companies for further 
investigation under the criteria below: 
I) Selected firms should have CEO succession events from 2002 to the end of 
2007 (if there are two or more changes in the same firm, I only record the latest one).3 
2) Selected firms should not operate in the financial industry.4 
3) Selected firms should have CEOs and Board of Directors' profiles, 
compensation and demographic information available in our data sources. 
4) Selected firms should have CEOs' shareholder letters/statements available in 
their annual reports from our data sources.5 
3 We use the Boardex analysis function and Bloomberg Mgmt function to identify the CEO successions; 
crosschecking in two databases can calm down some validity and reliability concerns, particularly the 
missing data issues. 
4 Prior research reports that firms in the financial industry will behave differently (Page & Abdullah 2(09) 
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I collected data from seven places: 1) Bloomberg terminal 6; 2) Boardex 7; 3) 
Reuters' Thomson One Banker8 [TIB]; 4) Dow Jones Factiva9; 5) Nexis UK 10; 6) the 
investor relationship section in the companies' corporate websites; 7) the Internet 
Archive. II I maximized observations by acquiring information from the Internet Archives 
(some old annual reports cannot be retrieved from Bloomberg or TIB; some dead 
companies' websites are no longer available). By crosschecking data in multiple sources, 
we eliminate the missing data problems and increase the number of firms qualifying for 
our study. 
I hired 6 university student assistants to type in the content of the CEO 
letters/statements for those low resolution annual report documents which cannot be 
recognized by the Optical Character Reader (OCR) software. These assistants helped me 
to download company news from Nexis UK and Factiva and also code the raw data 
retrieved from Boardex. I also employed a Structured Query Language (SQL) expert to 
develop and manage a database in which information from different sources can be 
integrated. 
After the above processes, I retained 148 companies from the FTSE All-Share 
Index in May 2011 and 71 companies from the dropped out records. Within these 219 
5 Not all firms have the CEO position, for example, 4imprint group pic. 
6 The Bloomberg terminal is a computer system providing data services that include real-time, historical and 
descriptive data, analytics and news on a number of markets and securities globally. 
7Boardex (www.boardex.com) is a database specialized for analyzing the profile and relationship of 
organization leaders in Europe and North America. It captures extensive personal information about 380,000 
leaders (all directors in UK publicly traded firms are covered), including date of birth, nationality, education 
background, working experiences, board and non-board positions, and compensation. 
8 Thomson ONE Banker is a research tool that provides a full range of financial data and authoritative source 
documents. 
9 Factiva is a database providing current and retrospective news stories, periodical articles, and financial data 
from thousands of sources worldwide, covering virtually every subject category. 
10 Nexis UK is a news and business resource with more UK regional coverage in biographical, company, 
regulatory and legal information. 
11 The Internet Archive (www.archivc.org) offers permanent storage of and free public access to collections 
of digitized materials, including websites. 
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companies, I decided to take out finns operating in the Industry Classification Benchmark 
(lCB) utility industry because the government background of these finns and their 
corporate governance are strongly influenced by regulatory factors (Cleary, 2002, Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). 
After scanning through the available fmancial information, I also removed some 
outliers/strange finns, for example, those firms with negative sales figures or abnormal 
financial performance [return on sales (ROS), return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity(ROE)]. I eventually retained 198 CEO succession cases in our sample which took 
place from 2002 to the end of 2007. These 198 firms are finally distilled into our dataset. 
2.5. The raw data and the content analysis 
2.5.1. News articles in the media & retrieval 
Company news or company stories are important raw data sources for management 
researchers. They can provide new information about a firm's strategies to the market 
(Uotila et aI., 2009), draw attention to a company (Barber and Odean, 2008) and reflect 
public perceptions of a company's actions as a watchdog (Bednar, 2012, Zavyalova et aI., 
2012). 
For this thesis, company news is obtained from Factiva for each fiscal year 
(sources include Dow Jones Newswires, Reuters Newswires and major news and business 
publications such as Bloomberg and the Financial Times and so forth). A comparison of 
Factiva to Nexis UK and other databases demonstrates that Factiva is more complete with 
better coverage (for licenses and copyright reasons). Factiva is selected because of its 
generality, specificity and international focus. I only included articles containing the 
names of a company (including abbreviations in various versions, for example, the ticker 
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name) in the headline. Factiva's intelligent indexing tags help us to screen out irrelevant 
documents when the name or abbreviation of a company causes ambiguity. I also filtered 
out those duplicate articles in the news by using the Factiva "de-duplication" option. We 
also selected the "corporate/industrial news" option to reduce less relevant news further. 
Eventually, I gathered 428 megabytes of plain-text data in total, averaging 112.5 articles, 
39323 words for each firm per year. For the scope of this thesis, the company news data 
had been mainly used to identify CEO turnover types explicitly l2. 
2.5.2. CEOs' shareholder letters/statements 
CEOs' letters to shareholders are commonly available documents in annual reports. 
They reflect the cognition of CEOs (Fiol, 1995). Unlike other financial statements, CEOs' 
letters to shareholders contain not only historical information, but also future forecasts 
(Geppert and Lawrence, 2008) which will be of interest to the public and shareholders to 
explore the mind of the CEOs. A CEO's words are powerful storytelling tools, fashioning 
opinions and offering important points of view (Amernic and Craig, 2007). Narrative 
information has been demonstrated to have power of explanation (Tennyson et aI., 1990) 
in annual reports, and CEOs' letters to shareholders are platforms for preaching 
management's philosophies. CEOs' letters to shareholders are important instances of the 
use of language in the discourse of managers, providing valuable information such as the 
motives, attitudes and mental models of the CEOs (Amernic et aI., 2010). 
Although some might argue that companies sometimes use public relationship 
experts to decorate the content of these letters, researchers (Salancik and Meindl, 1984) 
have still found consistent CEO influences in these letters. CEOs project a "tone" for their 
12 For more details about how I used the data, please refer to the section 3.4.2. Dependent variable- CEO 
turnover types. 
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companies and the narrative elements of CEOs' shareholder letters have a huge influence 
on the firms' strategy (Geppert and Lawrence, 2008). The thinking and feeling issues of 
CEOs' shareholder letters are primarily determined by CEOs because they have to endorse 
them. As a signatory, the CEO assumes legal responsibility for its content (Schoenberger, 
2001). No matter whether the letters are entirely crafted by the CEOs or not, they are 
indications of the CEOs' mind-sets. CEOs have strong incentives to scrutinize and 
approve the final version before signature. The letters disclose the focus and emphasis of 
the CEOs. Annual CEO letters attempt to engage people's emotions and commitment to 
define their reality and to secure their compliance. CEOs' shareholder letters are one of 
the most obvious and understudied framing devices which researchers can access. They 
are important raw data sources for this research study. 
2.5.3. Computer-aided content analysis (DICTION 5.0 & L1WC) 
Content analysis (CA) is a technique making inference by objectively and 
systematically identifying the specified characteristics of a message (Holsti, 1969) which 
include various formats, not only text, but also pictures, videotapes, as well as other visual 
or verbal data (Stemler, 2001). Roughly, CA is a structured process used to find patterns 
that occur in any form of communication (Geppert and Lawrence, 2008). These data must 
be durable in nature. CA is preferred, while other methods are too costly, no longer 
possible, or too obtrusive by using other techniques (Krippendorff, 1980). The CA of 
texts offers a number of potential benefits; it can be used to identify differences among 
communicators (Weber, 1990) and avoid recall biases (Barr et aI., 1992). It is also useful 
for examining trends and patterns in documents (Stemler, 200]). 
The CA of written documents is useful for reconstructing the perceptions and 
beliefs of their authors (D'Aveni and MacMillan, 1990). The basic assumption for CA is 
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that authors' mental models can be detected through the presence of, absence of, and 
frequency with which certain concepts are used in texts (Carley, 1997). 
Generally speaking, there are three kinds of CA methodology (Morris, 1994), 
(Short and Palmer, 2008), i.e. human scored schema, individual word count systems and 
artificial intelligent computerized systems. The first method will defme units of analysis 
(word, phrase, sentence, paragraph, full text); then coding rules are developed for each 
category. Human coders should be trained to classify text according to specific 
classification standards. Individual word count systems classify text into a number of 
semantically equivalent categories and use frequency counts to determine the relative 
importance of each category in a text (Weber, 1990). Artificial intelligence systems 
consider the syntax and lexicon of words (Rosenberg et aI., 1990), which help us to solve 
out the problems of words with more than a single meaning. 
Words used are as a reflection of individual differences, situational and social 
processes and psychological changes (Pennebaker et aI., 2003). For this thesis, two 
popular computer-aided text analysis (CATA) software, i.e. DICTION 5.0 and LIWC, 
were applied. 
LIWC categorized 2300 words (Pennebaker et aI., 2003) and data analysis will 
retrieve these words or word stems within a file of text and classify tMm in 70 linguistic 
dimensions such as standard language categories, psychological processes, relativity and 
specific content areas. From many experiments, LIWC serves as a valid approach to 
measure the verbal expression of a language user's emotion and cognition (Pennebaker 
and Francis, 1996). LIWC has been shown as a valid and reliable approach to measure 
individuals' psychological characteristics in the language disclosure process (Pennebaker 
and Francis, 1996). Even after considering the problems of using irony, sarcasm and 
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unusual sentence structure in texts, LIWC can still be seen as a useful method to gauge the 
emotional expression, intention and cognition of the writers. LIWC has been validated by 
having judges rate the emotion and cognition contents of thousands of texts (Pennebaker 
and King, 1999). LIWC is particularly useful for this thesis because it can measure some 
focal constructs that I plan to investigate: NE and FF A. 
DICTION 5.0 is software developed by Hart and his colleagues (Hart, 2000) and 
widely used in strategic management and political science studies. DICTION 5.0 has 31 
pre-defined dictionaries containing more than 10,000 words. It utilizes the artificial 
intelligence technique and provides "custom" functions for content analysis in various 
fields (Short and Palmer, 2008). It was designed by communication researchers and 
focuses on the subtle power of word choice and verbal tone (Hart, 2001). DICTION 5.0 
analysis is performed only on the text format in this research. Other information such as 
graphics and tables are ignored. It is calculated at the word level. DICTION 5.0 assigns 
each word to a concept classification or theme. In the Bligh et al. (2004) evaluation of 
contemporary content analysis software, they believe that DICTION 5.0 is excellent 
software which is explicitly designed to examine the linguistic elements of leaders. 
Both DICTION 5.0 and LIWC are used to analyze the raw data, i.e. CEOs' 
shareholder letters in this research study to extract variables for further investigation. The 
only source for text analysis was the CEO shareholder letters. These letters can be found 
in the company annual reports which have been downloaded from various places such as 
the company websites, TIB, Bloomberg, and Internet Archive. Using two different 
software packages for this research study is expected to improve the quality of the study. 
They can serve as a helicopter and a car, respectively, to help us learn about a city from 
different viewpoints (Hart, 200 I). Built on these raw data and preliminary results from the 
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content analysis, the following three essay chapters will provide valuable insights into the 
CEO transition epoch. For more detail on the data extraction process and procedure for 
each focal construct, please refer to each individual paper in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 3. Essay One: CEOs' psychological factors and CEO turnover 
types 
ABSTRACT: 
I use the psycholinguistic analysis methods to investigate how CEOs' psychological 
factors influence their types of departure, i.e. voluntary and involuntary CEO turnovers in 
the FTSE All-Share index companies. Apart from those conventional reasons, e.g. firms' 
prior performance, CEOs' power, their future focus attention (FFA) and negative emotion 
(NE) provide crucial explanations determining their turnover types. Empirically, this study 
identifies that the level of CEOs' FFA, signaling the planned career management 
behaviors, will increase the likelihood of voluntary CEO turnover. I also found that the 
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ecord></Cite><lEndNote>(Snow,1989, Hecfactors, appreciating the proactive roles of 
CEOs in the leadership succession process, the comprehensive views of this research help 




Chief Executive Officer (CEO) succession is an important, unique and very visible 
process (1994) in which predecessors leave their positions and successors commence their 
new jobS. 13 CEO turnover represents a major event for the firm and can determine its 
subsequent performance and strategic direction (Furtado and Karan, 1990). Generally 
speaking, there are three types of CEO succession: (i) involuntary CEO turnover (Shen 
and Cho, 2005, Wagner et aI., 1984), sometimes called CEO dismissal (Wiersema and 
Zhang, 2011, Fredrickson et aI., 1988, Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 2006), or CEO forced 
turnover (Chang and Wong, 2009, Campbell et aI., 2011) which means the old CEO's 
departure is against his or her will; (ii) voluntary CEO turnover whereby the old CEOs 
self-select to step down voluntarily and smoothly, for example, ordinary retirement, taking 
up new roles internally or externally (for example, a prestigious government officer 
appointment), changing life style and so on; (iii) accidental CEO turnover whereby the old 
CEOs cannot continue their duties because of experiencing accidents, health problems or 
sudden death. 
A majority of current CEO turnover literature represents the dismissal models 
(Fredrickson et aI., 1988, Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 2006). This might be due to people 
enjoying exciting stories; most research efforts in this topic focus on studying the 
antecedents of involuntary CEO turnover. The other two types have not been investigated 
deeply. For example, for voluntary turnover (ii), those due to ordinary retirement and 
planned succession have not received much research attention (Shen and Cannella, 2003). 
For accidental CEO turnover (iii), old CEOs, boards of directors (BoDs), nor anyone else 
have much control over it. Much succession research has not distinguished the difference 
between forced and voluntary turnover (Kesner and Sebora, 1994). Even a fair number of 
13 This study will consistently use the term "old CEO" for those leaving their CEO position. 
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recent studies use all the turnovers to represent dismissal (Rowe and Cannella, 2005, 
Giambatista et aI., 2005, Hilger et aI., 2012). By definition, the CEO turnover type 
classification depends on the old CEOs' own will. Existing studies hold the common 
assumptions that BoDs are the key decision-makers and old CEOs behave passively in 
determining the types of exit. Moreover, key CEO turnover models (Fredrickson et aI., 
1988, Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 2006) are cognition based and ignore emotion as an 
unconscious reasoning method. 
The basic assumption of previous models is that CEOs are not willing to leave 
their prestigious positions with great benefits (Dunford et aI., 2008). In this study, taking 
into account the old CEOs' proactive roles, we investigate whether or not those ignored 
elements, i.e. the importance of their emotion in decision-making, have some impact on 
the types of CEO departure. Based on the dual process theory, the attention based view, 
and the literature in executive career management, this research attempts to investigate the 
types of CEO step-down from a new perspective. We found that emotion serves as another 
channel for the bound rational choices, particularly in the context of CEO succession 
where old CEOs and BoDs face cognitive limitations in the complex situations under 
pressure. 
3.2. Literature review 
Due to the technical difficulties to separate voluntary and involuntary CEO 
turnovers, many researchers actually treat all turnovers as dismissals (DeFond and Park, 
1999), (Shen and Cannella, 2002). Actually, the mechanisms determining whether there 
will be a voluntary or involuntary turnover have not been further explored. 
For an involuntary succession, the old CEOs do not plan to leave their posts and 
the replacements are against their own will. Forced turnover is a politically contentious 
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process (Vancil, 1987). There are strong conflicts between old CEOs and the board in the 
dismissal process (Shen and Cannella, 2002). The old CEOs decide to stay in their posts 
and face the challenges from BoDs; consequently, BoDs have to make their judgments to 
execute the dismissal. In contrast, the process of voluntary CEO turnover is smoother. 
Sometimes voluntary turnover is called planned succession, routine turnover or normal 
turnover (Helfat and Bailey, 2005). By definition, in a voluntary turnover, the old CEO 
takes his or her own initiative and self-selects to step down; he or she plays a key role in 
planning and organizing this process (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010). It is less destructive 
for the continuity of the company (Farquhar, 1994). Furthermore, in a voluntary turnover 
process, the old CEOs themselves are the key decision-makers. In Taylor's (2010) study 
of CEOs in the Forbes annual surveys, firing a CEO is estimated to cost shareholders 5.9% 
of firm assets, or $254 million ($1.3 billion) for the median (mean) in the sample. It 
includes the direct cost of urgently searching for a replacement, the potential cost of 
lawsuits, the old CEOs' golden parachute packages and so on. Compared to a voluntary 
CEO turnover, a forced turnover has higher losses in terms of human and social capital 
(Dess and Shaw, 2001) which might be taken away by the dismissed CEOs. By taking a 
number of trusted lieutenants away to the firm's competitors, CEO dismissal might create 
risks in leaking confidential strategic information and trade secrets. 
Compared to a voluntary CEO turnover, in an involuntary CEO turnover, the 
productivity lost by firms and the top management teams (TMTs) is higher (Gibelman and 
Gelman, 2002). CEOs often playa connection role in a series of networks. After an 
involuntary CEO turnover, other TMT members will also face the pressures of 
disciplinary action because of the negative domino effect (Siebert and Zubanov, 2009). A 
dismissed CEO is more likely to sabotage and generate potential harmful consequences. 
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Former CEOs might possess unique monitoring and advising abilities. Recent 
studies found that voluntary CEO turnover is an alternative way of helping the firms retain 
part of the old CEOs' valuable social and human capital even after they leave their 
position. An example might be in retaining former CEOs on board (Evans et aI., 2010) or 
maintaining good relationships with former CEOs who might already hold better positions 
elsewhere to access those resources associated with them (Hutchinson and Russell, 2013). 
One key assumption of the major prior studies argues that old CEOs are reluctant 
to step down from their prestigious position (Goodstein and Boeker, 1991, Ocasio, 1994, 
Dunford et aI., 2008). In fact, failing to plan is planning to fail. The CEO has been seen as 
a risky position and CEOs are described as "the world's most prominent temp workers" 
(Kaplan and Minton, 2012, Lucier et aI., 2004). According to the Wall Street Journal, 
successions will sometimes be planned very early beforehand by the old CEOs voluntarily 
(Kaplan and Minton, 2012, Lucier et aI., 2004). In some high performing firms, CEOs 
start to plan for their succession right after taking office (Zajac, 1990), (Shen and 
Cannella, 2003). In this research, we propose that we can uncap the reasons for the 
dichotomy of CEO turnovers by investigating old CEOs' will. 
Different from previous dismissal models, the focus object of this study swings 
from BoDs to the departing CEOs. Old CEOs are no longer passive; taking a career 
development perspective, they are the key decision-makers for their own destinies. Even 
in involuntary turnovers, we need to consider the mechanisms supporting the old CEOs' 
decision to stay on in their posts and face the challenges from the BoDs (the reasons of 
noncooperation between old CEOs and BoDs). Hence, this study will look at the old 
CEOs' cognition and emotion which are supposed to have some impact on their own 
decisions and also on the judgment of BoDs. 
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Scholars believe that two common factors separating voluntary and involuntary 
turnovers are the firms' prior performance and the old CEOs' power (Zhang, 2008, Shen 
and Cho, 2005), Cheramie et aI., 2007). First, poor prior performance is the main factor 
that increases the probability of both voluntary and involuntary turnover (Cheramie et aI., 
2007, Fan et aI., 2007). However, for slightly better performing firms, they do not have 
intensive pressures to fire the old CEOs urgently and give them an opportunity to plan for 
their exit better. Researchers found that firms with forced CEO turnover have poorer 
financial performance in the year before the turnover, compared to firms with voluntary 
CEO turnover (Hazarika et aI., 2012, Lin, 2006). Second, an old CEO's weak power will 
increase the chances of involuntary turnover. Old CEOs possessing high power are more 
likely to have their say in the succession planning for a voluntary turnover; in contrast, an 
old CEO's weak power will increase the likelihood of being sacked. Studies have found 
that powerful CEOs are able to insulate themselves from dismissal, to retire for purely 
voluntary reasons, and to control the process of their replacements in spite of poor 
performance (Pitcher et aI., 2000). 
Furthermore, current understanding sees old CEOs as being very paSSIve in 
selecting their exit mode; little has been discussed about old CEOs' thoughts, emotions, 
and behaviors and in particular, their wills (i.e. their wishes and desires). We believe that 
these factors are crucial because by defmition, whether a turnover is voluntary or 
involuntary depends on the old CEO's will. To understand this will, taking into 
consideration the career management perspective (Cheramie et aI., 2007), we have to look 
at old CEOs' attitudes and intentions (or not) to step down. 
It has been known that the cognitive process is an explicit process in decision-
making, but emotion plays an important role in implicit heuristic decision-making (Evans, 
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2003, GIlkey et aI., 2010). We have to consider both old CEOs' and BoDs' emotion 
infusion information processing. We propose that our research will make some 
contributions to the field by incorporating these important issues. 
3.3. Hypotheses development 
From a boundary-less career perspective (Sullivan and Arthur, 2006), executives 
are not only organizational resources, but also individuals who seek to manage their own 
careers by taking advantage of opportunities and by changing their jobs to maximize their 
success (Eby et aI., 2003). Cognition and emotion are two fundamental components of the 
human mind that serve to activate motivation systems, mobilize resources, enhance 
perceptual processing, prepare for action, and assist in selecting appropriate behaviors 
(Bradley, 2008). Cognition is considered as rational, dispassionate, and "cold", while 
emotion is considered as irrational, passionate and "hot". We propose that we can use 
cognition and emotion to understand the ways in which CEOs respond to problems. 
Therefore, by taking into consideration both emotion and cognition, a better understanding 
will be gained for the old CEO's motives of career management. 
Cognition and emotion are important common factors enabling us to gauge CEOs' 
motivations, intentions, commitment and enthusiasm to deal with the problems that they 
currently face (Piderit, 2000). Taking into account these subjective (soft) assessment 
variables together with objective (hard) factors such as performance and power, we can 
better explain the differences in CEO turnover types. 
Attention is a scarce resource of CEO cognition. Attention is the process of 
"noticing, interpreting and focusing time and effort" (OCASIO, 1997), p.188). CEOs need 
to allocate their attention across competing objectives. The ways in which old CEOs' 
channel and distribute their attention can predict and explain their decisions not only for 
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the companies, but also for themselves. We propose that the nature of an old CEO's 
attention will be a key career management factor for their types of exit, i.e. either to leave 
voluntarily or to leave forcedly. 
On the other hand, emotions impact on both the content and process of thinking 
(Forgas and George, 2001). Bazerman et al. (1998) suggest that while making a decision, 
people enter into a negotiation between the rational, cool-headed cognitive "should" self 
and the hot-headed, emotional "want" self. Not only can the "want" veto the decision of 
"should" self, but it may also know something important that the person has not yet 
realized. Hence, we propose that old CEOs' emotion is another key factor determining 
their exit type decisions. 
In the study, we propose that the types of CEO turnover (voluntary versus 
involuntary) might depend not only on whether or not an old CEO really wants to 
(planned or not), but that it also might depend on whether or not the BoDs really have to 
force the old CEO out (being cooperative or not). 
3,3,1. Old CEOs' future focused attention & its Influences 
Future focus is an important CEO attention and is defined as the amount of 
attention devoted to events that are yet to occur (Yadav et aI., 2007, Chandy, 2010). 
Executive career management is the active and purposeful administration of the managers' 
career, such as career choices and career changes (Cheramie et aI., 2007). These future-
focus expectations will shape the way of their choices of exit. 
Zajac (1990) found that firms having CEO succession planning had better post-
succession performance than those without. Although some studies show that the BoDs do 
not engage in rigorous and formal succession planning (Larcker, 2011), informal CEO 
turnover planning is very common as an important planned behavior of the old CEOs 
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(Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010, Shen and Cannella, 2003). It also discloses old CEOs' 
willingness and intention to step down voluntarily. The intention of voluntary turnover 
implies that the old CEOs can plan for it more or less. In a voluntary CEO turnover, old 
CEOs have the opportunity to select the right time to step down, select appropriate 
successors and transfer their powers to them. Old CEOs' future orientation is very 
important for their planning in the succession process. Leaving the prestigious CEO 
position has big associated costs. For a planned CEO voluntary turnover, leaving the 
organization is less likely to be seen as a betrayal. Cognitive evaluations of future 
relationships with the organization will be raised. Even receiving a better offer from 
external organizations, the costs of image and reputation damage will be high if the old 
CEOs' relationships with the companies go wrong and are discovered by the public. The 
following arguments illustrate the importance of that old CEOs' FF A for the CEO exit 
types. 
3.3.1.1. Being proactive and prepared for the succession 
Future focus has a change-orientated nature. At the personal level, it helps old 
CEOs correctly interpret and predict their future career development; thus, they will be 
more prepared for career change. Future focus helps old CEOs develop better planning for 
themselves and for the firms as well. Highly future-focused individuals might be expected 
to be more influenced by goals, whereas others might be expected to be more influenced 
by feedback. As a result, it is possible that individuals high in FF A will be more 
committed to change because they are able to perceive the results of the future change and 
keep their attention on those desired end goals. Future-focused old CEOs have broader 
perceptions of future job characteristics and more positive attitudes toward the future 
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(Sutton and Griffin, 2004). We believe that old CEOs' FFA is important for themselves to 
achieve sustainable career development and to help the firm create dynamic capabilities. 
For a voluntary CEO turnover, future-focused old CEOs are able to do more 
planning for their firms, making things more organized before he/she leaves. FF A helps 
people deal with stress, prevent adversity and generate proactive efforts (Aspinwall, 2005). 
In this study, voluntary turnover is a proactive and planned behavior; old CEOs who are 
orientated towards future goals take their initiative to prevent future adverse consequences. 
3.3.1.2. Self-regulation and controls 
Future orientation is a curial component of temporal self-regulation theory (Hall 
and Fong, 2007). In a study of people in a team setting, Waller et a1. (2001) found that 
people with a future time perspective and high time urgency outperform others because 
they are more aware of the deadlines and schedules. Being in an urgent context in the 
succession period, we infer that old CEOs' FF A will generate time awareness for them to 
cope with the tight schedule. As a result, high future-focused CEOs become more 
organized and are able to meet the deadline set by the BoDs; they can select an 
riodical><full-title>Strategic Management Journal</full-title></periodi 
In psychology, the attention to future consequences will increase people's locus of 
control and lead to an achievement motivation (Strathman et aI., 1994). Therefore, we 
believe that old CEOs' FFA will demonstrate their control over current situations and their 
ongoing influences on the future development of their firms. In a voluntary turnover, old 
CEOs are willing to leave and have certain control over selecting their successor; they can 
also determine the successor's extent of similarity (Hambrick et aI., 1993,(Nielsen, 2009), 
(Zajac and Westphal, 1996). Therefore, CEOs who have high FF A will be more likely to 
opt for a voluntary succession. 
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Oppositely, low CEO FFA has less control over the succession and this is more 
likely to lead to unorganized behavior and missing important deadlines set by the BoDs; 
consequently, it can increase the chances of dismissal. Some researchers believe that those 
lacking FF A only perform when the deadline is approaching (Shipp et aI., 2009); old 
CEOs with a low level of future focus tend to procrastinate; therefore, BoDs' disciplinary 
action have to be executed. With a low level of FF A, old CEOs will be perceived as less 
self-regulated, demotivated and undisciplined. Therefore, a lack of self-regulation will 
decrease the likelihood of self-managing voluntary CEO turnover; they tend to leave their 
destinies in the hands of the BoD. 
From the standpoint of BoDs, old CEOs with a low FF A may not focus their 
cognitive attention on a goal. BoDs will deem old CEOs with a low level of FF A as not 
taking enough responsibility; less self-disciplinary CEOs are unlikely to have plans to 
leave voluntarily. This decreases BoDs' confidence and makes them worry about what 
will happen if "if tomorrow never comes". Hence, BoDs are more likely to enforce the 
dismissal. 
3.3.1.3. Ambition and achievement 
Old CEOs with a low level of future focus are more concerned about the 
immediate benefits of remaining in their positions. A high level of FFA indicates CEOs' 
willingness to maintain their relationships with the companies even after they leave; it also 
indicates the possibility that an old CEO's continuity to provide support (Evans et aI., 
20 I 0) to the firm even after he/she has been succeeded. Individuals with high FF A may 
embrace changes as they coincide with their tendency to focus on what is yet to come. 
Hence, highly future-focused CEOs have less difficulty in changing their current positions. 
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Future orientation gives people wings to soar to new heights of achievement 
(Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999). The CEO is the highest position in a company. Future focus 
is a promotion orientation in nature (Fried and Slowik, 2004). Hence, a low FFA indicates 
an old CEO's preference to keep the status quo and they are unlikely to leave their 
positions voluntarily; in contrast, a high level of future focus reflects old CEOs' 
motivation to a better future even after stepping down. 
Research on the psychology of rehabilitation found that patients with future 
orientated thinking will reduce their stress and cope better with the aftermath of trauma 
(Holman and Silver, 1998). To cope with environmental challenges, managers have to 
unlearn past habits and learn to forget (Prahalad and Hamel, 1994). Placing too much 
attention on the past and present matters to hand would not facilitate the problem solving. 
Old CEOs with a low level of FF A are more likely to allow themselves to be 
overshadowed by current troubles. Low FF A in old CEOs indicates that they have become 
stuck in the firms' rigidity and inertia from past experiences. With a lower future focus, 
old CEOs are less adaptive and less flexible and will react passively. Therefore, they are 
less prepared to step down from the CEO position and this increases the chances of 
involuntary turnover. 
Furthermore, low future orientation will generate less optimistic predictions 
(Buehler et aI., 2005), (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). From the perspective of BoDs, 
low future orientated old CEOs will be immersed in current problems and will be seen as 
having a lack of capabilities. We assume that low CEOs' FFA will produce pessimistic 
projections, thereby reducing the interest of the BoDs, making it more likely to trigger the 
forced turnover decision. 
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3.3.1.4. Comparison and judgment (assimilation and contrast effects) 
In job satisfaction studies, highly future-focused individuals will experience an 
assimilation effect, whereas low future-focused individuals will experience a contrast 
effect (Tversky and Griffin, 1991). A contrast effect is the enhancement, relative to norms, 
perception and cognition (in the succession context, a contrast effect emphasizes the 
inflated perceptions of current CEO position, and makes old CEOs more conservative). 
The assimilation effect is a felt psychological closeness of social surroundings that 
influence self-representation and self-knowledge (in the succession context, CEOs will 
appreciate and be influenced by the opinions of other people around). In the case of CEO 
succession, if the people, particularly BoDs who are around the old CEOs, want them to 
leave the position, old CEOs will be more likely to leave voluntarily and cooperatively. 
To sum up, greater FF A makes old CEOs more prepared for the succession and 
plan better for their careers. It increases their control over the turnover process; FF A raises 
old CEOs' ambition and makes them willing to shift away from their status quo. Highly 
future-focused CEOs will be more adaptive and flexible and have more positive 
judgments and perceptions about their future career and life. It increases the chance of 
their voluntary exit. In contrast, low FF A make old CEOs obsessed with their current CEO 
position; this is less likely to generate an optimistic atmosphere and less likely to help old 
CEOs control their career future; it shows that they are less responsible for the jobs and 
decreases BoDs' positive impression and judgments of them. Given the above debate, we 
form a hypothesis as below: 
Hypothesis J: The old CEOs' FF A will influence their succession types. The 
higher the level of an old CEO's FF A. the more likely he/she will take a voluntary 
turnover; the lower the level FF A of an old CEO, the more likely he/she will take an 
involuntary exit. 
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3.3.2. Old CEOs' negative emotion lNE) & its influences 
3.3.2.1. Alternative job opportunities and psychological contracts 
The NE of old CEOs demonstrates their abilities in the job market and hence, 
reduces their chance of attracting alternative employment offers (Peterson, 2010). In an 
employee turnover study, those who have no alternative job opportunities on hand will 
more likely display negative emotion (Maertz and Griffeth, 2004). Without an alternative 
offer on hand and having less opportunity to attract external employers, they will tend to 
stick with their current CEO positions more. 
The psychological contracts (Rousseau, 1989, Kidder and Buchholtz, 2002) are the 
mutual beliefs, perceptions and informal obligations between employees and the 
organization. In our study, the psychological contracts are the reciprocal exchanges 
between CEOs and BoDs. A breach of the psychological contract signaled by the NE 
discloses that there is a mismatch between CEOs and BoDs. Oppositely, for both old 
CEOs and BoDs, a low level of negative emotion is associated with mutual respect and 
obeying the psychological contract. A low level of NE will reduce to conflict between 
CEOs and BoDs which, consequently, makes them easily agree with a decent voluntary 
exit. Furthermore, it reflects the possibility of old CEOs' continuous support for the firm 
after the succession. 
3.3.2.2. Contagion of old CEOs' negative emotion 
Moods and displayed emotions spread among people like viruses: they are 
contagious (Rapson et aI., 1993). These negative emotions spread through the organization 
and distort members' relationships with each other (Barsade, 2002). Due to their low 
emotional energy (Collins, 1990, Collins, 2004), such people are seen as depressed, 
lacking initiative, having low solidarity and alienated by others. 
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CEOs' NE is very important in the interactions among TMTs (Liu and Maitiis, 
2012). Emotional contagion is automatic, unintentional and unassuming (Newcombe and 
Ashkanasy, 2002). Leaders who have NE tend to be rated by team members as being less 
effective (Gaddis et aI., 2004, Lewis, 2000). Bad moods will lead to uncooperative 
behaviors (Hertel et aI., 2000). NEs displayed by a CEO generate problems by 
diminishing top team members' participation and cooperation (Kisfalvi and Pitcher, 2003). 
This in tum generates feelings of helplessness and frustration, reducing people's 
commitment, preventing valuable discussion (Smith and Edmondson, 2006) and altering 
the power and status among board members (Brundin and Nordqvist, 2008). 
Therefore, in the leadership transition period, a high level NE of old CEOs 
decreases their ability to be involved in preparing for their succession and control over 
their own prosperity. Since these old CEOs have no more aces to play, they will more 
likely decide to stay in their current CEO position. With NE, old CEOs are unlikely to 
accept the BoDs' advice and will be uncooperative with the BoDs. 
3.3.Z.3. Anticipated emotion and reduced commitment 
People are motivated to make decisions that bring them to experience positive or 
avoid negative future (anticipated) emotions (Mellers, 2000, Simonson, 1992, Zeelenberg 
et aI., 1996). Continually investing in a losing situation indicates an escalation of 
commitment (Staw, 1976, Brockner, 1992). Individuals' NEs are negatively associated 
with their escalation of commitment from coping and depressive realism perspectives 
(Wong et aI., 2006). To cope with the NE, people normally use an "avoidance" strategy to 
withdraw form situations that induce NEs. This strategy is particularly adopted when the 
people are responsible for the prior decision (Ng and Wong, 2008). 
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At this stage, we believe that old CEOs' NE has made them decide to stick with 
their CEO positions. Because of the contagion of negative emotion, BoDs pick up the NE 
as well. Because BoDs hold their reasonability for prior the decision in hiring the CEOs, 
with NEs passed from old CEOs, BoDs will be more likely to select withdrawal 
strategies which weakens their intention to let old CEOs go decently. Thus, we propose 
when they are infected by old CEOs, the BoDs' NE can prevent them from escalating 
their commitment to the old CEOs (for example, they will still keep them on board after 
the succession). NEs also reflect the noncooperation between BoDs and old CEOs, which 
reduces the possibility of voluntary step-down. 
3.3.2.4. The influences on BoDs' in/ormation processing 
NEs influence one's information processing (Forgas, 1995, Baron, 2008). Infected 
by old CEOs, we believe that BoDs' NE will influence both their affective judgment and 
cognitive judgment systems implicitly and explicitly.14 On the one hand, bad feelings can 
directly inform a fast affective initial dismissal decision intuitively based on heuristic cues 
because BoDs use their NEs as a shortcut to infer the evaluative reaction. On the other 
hand, via BoDs' cognitive judgment system, NEs downgrade CEOs' efficacy scores and 
attribute the reasons causing the crisis as being down to their old CEOs (using self-serving 
biases to blame others). In this way, BoDs can shift the blame away from themselves and 
put them onto the old CEOs (scapegoats). 
The relationships between negative affect and attribution styles are important 
(Weiner, 1995). Negative affect can make BoDs more easily recognize negative 
information. For example, it makes BoDs more alert to certain bad headlines (for example, 
14 There are two parallel modes of information process in human judgments and decisions (CHAIKEN, S. & 
TROPE, Y. (1999) Dual-process theories in social psychology, Guilford Publication, DAVID, P. & HIRSHMAN, E. 
(1998) Dual-Mode Presentation and Its Effect on Implicit and Explicit Memory. The American Journal of 
Psychology, 111,77-87.). 
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scandals) in media and in gossip. We propose that the negative affect of BoDs makes them 
believe that poor performance attributions are permanent (problems will last a long time) 
and pervasive (problems happen in many places) (Ford and Baucus, 1987). 
NE also reduces the alternative alertness and narrows one's perceptual fields 
(Baron, 1998). It reduces the frequency or quality of social contacts between decision-
makers and the external world. In our case, negative moods will make BoDs less likely to 
ask consultants for help or external people for advice. By reducing the communication and 
negotiation with the old CEOs, forced turnover will bounce out as a plausible option for 
the BoDs. 
Induced moods distort the appraisal results; it even happens in highly familiar 
interactions and known others (Forgas, 1994). We believe that NE will decrease BoDs' 
assessment scores for CEOs. Since negative affect is stable (Martinko et aI., 2003), BoDs 
will probably believe that the causes of failure are more stable so that the forced turnover 
decisions will be firmer. Furthermore, with negative emotions, BoDs will generate a 
negative attitude towards their CEOs. When BoDs believe an old CEO is helpless and 
behaves uncooperatively with them, they will determine the dismissal and stop negotiating 
with himlher. After drawing on the final forced turnover conclusion, BoDs' NE facilitates 
vigilant monitoring behavior (Diamond and Aspinwall, 2003). Hence, they are more likely 
to make sure the implementation of forced succession in a tough way to the end. 
To sum up, old CEOs' NE will arouse an emotional contagion spread which, in 
tum, will make them lose control over the succession and their career future. It makes 
them hold tight onto their CEO positions. Old CEOs' NE, as a signal of breaching the 
psychological contracts between BoDs and themselves, will generate further conflicts. 
Influenced by the old CEOs, the NE of BoDs will reduce their appraisal results and 
- 40-
commitment to the old CEOs; it will influence the BoDs' judgment about old CEOs' 
capabilities and attitudes, as well as motivations. The damaged impressions and 
communication, the NE of noncooperation between old CEOs and BoDs, will lead to an 
involuntary turnover. In contrast, low level old CEO NE enhances their capabilities and 
attitudes to arrange for the turnover preparation and career management; a lower level of 
NE will increase the old CEOs' chance to opt for voluntary turnover. Based on the 
discussions above, we develop the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Old CEOs' negative emotion will influence the types of CEO 
turnover. A high level of old CEOs' NE will increase their chances of getting an 
involuntary turnover and a low level of old CEOs' NE will increase their likelihood of 
having a voluntary turnover. 
3.4. Methods 
We selected the observations from the FTSE All-Share Index 15 based on the 
selection criteria below: 1) the succession took place from 2002 to 2007; 2) firms in non-
financial and non-utility industries only; and 3) BoDs and CEOs' information and CEOs' 
shareholder letters were available. There were 198 CEO succession events in our sample 
during this time period. These succession events were identified from the Boardex and 
Bloomberg databases. Due to the limitations of data availability for some key variables, 
the final analytic model contains 166 observations in total. Within these cases, 57.2% of 
CEO turnovers were classified as involuntary turnovers. The average age of old CEOs in 
the year of succession was 54.86 years, and their average working history in the company 
was 10.73 years. Of the old CEOs, 12% also concurrently held chairman positions. These 
companies had an average of 19,709 employees and £2,680 million annual revenue on 
15 The top 600s companies in the FTSE (Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange). 
- 41-
average. Only publicly traded companies were included because we needed to obtain the 
CEOs' psychological factors using the results from psycho linguistic content analyses of 
CEO letters to shareholders. 
We attempted to investigate those extra "soft" and "hot" factors of CEO that we 
believe contribute to explaining the different CEO turnover types. From a positivism 
perspective, control variables were entered into the analysis before new predictors, i.e. old 
CEOs' FF A and NE whose effects we are primarily concerned with. The comparisons 
among different models can help us better appreciate these additional influences. 
3.4.1. Constructs and Measurements 
Table 3.1: Summary of constructs, variables, measurements and sources 
ConsbUctsidefinitions Variables Operationalization Sources 
Outcome construct Turnover type: CEO age~ 63, Boardex 
CEO succession: 1 (involuntary stripped board Bloomberg 
CEOs step down against their own turnover) membership, Nexis UK 
wills or not o (voluntary No better afterward Factiva 
turnover) appointments 
Focal constructs: FFA Extracted from the CEO shareholder 
Future focused attention: % of words related content analysis results letters 
The amount of a CEO's attention to future in a text ofLIWC 
devoted to objects and things that 
are yet to occur. 
-----
Negative emotion: NE Extracted from the 
The intensity of the negative % of words related content analysis results 
feelings/moods expressed by to negative ofLIWC 
CEOs emotion in a text 
Controlled prior focal constructs ROS(ROA, Firms' performance 
Prior performance ROETOT) one year before TIB 
succession 
... ... . .. 
_. 
.._-
CEO power CEO duality CEOs also act as Boardex 
Chairman; Bloomberg 
Board size Number of directors; 
CEO age Age of the CEO; 
Years in thejirms Number of years a 
person worked for the 
organization 
Other controlled factors Firm size Logarithm of firms' TIB 
total asset 
Debt to asset ratio (Debt/asset)'" 1 00% 
Time and industry Year and industry 
effects dummies 
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Table 3.1 summarizes the definitions of constructs, variables, operationalization 
and data sources of our dependent, independent and control variables. 
3.4.2. Dependent variable- CEO turnover types 
We adopted two parallel methods recommended by some well-known previous 
studies to separate involuntary and voluntary CEO turnovers (Shen and Cannella, 2002), 
(Zhang, 2006). First, an explicit approach: we collected three continuous years' news in 
Nexis UK for the old CEOs from one year before to one year after the succession. If the 
news showed that those CEOs 1) were directly reported as being fired, or 2) had resigned 
unexpectedly or immediately, or 3) took early retirement due to undisclosed personal 
reasons, we then coded these cases as involuntary turnover. We identified 76 fired CEOs 
using this method. The second approach is a calculation-based approach; we used the age 
of old CEOs and the continuity of their board memberships at the time of succession as 
indicators. If the old CEOs' age was lower than or equal to 63 when they left the CEO 
position without retaining their board memberships, then we classified them as a suspected 
dismissal. Based on these suspected results, particularly for those misaligned with 
identified firms using the first methods, we checked 1) whether or not the old CEOs had 
been appointed as CEOs or to higher positions in other organizations after the turnover; 2) 
whether such succession was due to death, health problems, or merger situations. Using 
the second method, I generated 112 CEO involuntary turnover cases and 81 voluntary 
turnover cases, 193 in total (because of the data availability of some variables, the final 
analytic model retained 166 cases). The involuntary cases identified by the second method 
cover all the cases identified by the first one. Therefore, we applied the second method to 
code our dependent variable dichotomously: involuntary CEO turnover as I, voluntary 
turnover as O. 
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3.4.3. Independent and control variables 
3.4.3.1. Focal (illdepelldent) variables 
CEOs' letters/reviews/statements in the annual reports serve as raw data for our 
focal variables, FFA and NE. We used a predefined psycholinguistic program LIWC 
(Pennebaker et aI., 200 I) to extract these variables. LIWC has been proved as a valid and 
reliable approach to measure cognition, attention and emotion in the language disclosure 
process (Pennebaker and Francis, 1996). Even after considering the problems of using 
irony, sarcasm and unusual sentence structure in the texts, LIWC can still be seen as a 
reliable method to gauge the emotional expression and cognition of the writers. The CEOs' 
shareholder letters were content analyzed via matching words in various categorized 
dictionaries built into the LIWC program. LIWC calculates the percentage of words 
associated with one particular dictionary in the total number of words of a letter; thus, it 
controls the length of the writing sample (Kahn et aI., 2007). The negative emotion 
dictionary comprises 345 words (such as hate, worthless, enemy, fear, anger and sadness) 
that reflect the intensity ofCEOs' negative feelings and emotions. FFA is measured using 
the future tense category dictionary in LIWC, which includes 48 words such as will, might, 
shall, gonna, and so on. It reports the amount of CEOs' attention devoted to events and 
things that are yet to occur. 
3.4.3.2. Control variables 
As discussed in the theory and hypotheses section, poor prior performance and 
CEOs' weak power are two key factors leading to different types of CEO turnover. For 
performance, in this study we use ROS (return on sales) which is expected to have a 
negative impact on CEO involuntary turnover (Cannella et aI., 2008). We also control 
those characteristics signaling old CEOs' power such as CEO duality (the CEO also acts 
as a chairman at the same time), CEOs' age and the number of years they worked for the 
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company (number of years since he/she first joined the organization); we expect all these 
factors will negatively relate to CEO involuntary turnover. 
We control for board size, i.e. the total number of directors on the board (Zajac and 
Westphal, 1996); we also control the firm size (measured by the firms' total assets 
(logarithm) since some researchers show that larger firms would like to retain their old 
CEOs as board members (Evans et aI., 2010) and managers are more entrenched in large 
companies (Chang and Wong, 2009). We control for the capital structure (leverage, 
measured as the debt to asset ratio) because debtors play an important role in disciplining 
underperforming managers (Jensen, 1986). We also control for year and industry effects 
using dummy variables. 
All these independent variables and control variables are lagged one year in all 
analyses. In other words, for the causality, the types of CEO turnover will be predicted by 
the values of all the independent and control variables one year before the turnover. 
3.5. Data analysis 
To test our hypotheses, we adopt the most popular analysis method, logit 
regression, for studying top executive succession (52.1 % of empirical studies use logit 
regression methods, according to a systematic review) (Hilger et aI., 2012). Logit models 
have been broadly used in this field and these methods will make our results comparable 
with others. The dichotomous nature of our dependent variable determines the suitability 
of a logit model. The main purpose of this study is to examine the importance of 
additional "soft" and "hot" factors while appropriately controlling for other prior 
recognized important factors. Initially, two separated analyses of old CEOs' cognition and 
emotion were conducted. Subsequently, a combined model of both cognition and emotion 
was tested. By so doing, we were able to examine the relative explanatory power of old 
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CEOs' FFA and NE which are two distinct elements of a dual channel perspective. We 
were also able to explore the individual contribution of each variable in our combined 
model. 
Due to there being some missing values (some of the information from a few 
companies is not publicly available) for some variables, we finally included 166 cases into 
our logit regression model: 
In(L) = X/~ or Pr(y=llx)= exp(a+px) 
I-p l+exp(a+l3x) 
Table 3.2: Data description and correlation 
Variables Means S.D. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I.Turnover type 0.572 0.496 ; I 
,--1- ZI ~I--I _. - I - -,- ---2.ROS ~~.369 -118.46-1 -0.10* 1 i r--~I--l I i----I- -- . I - -1- ---
3.Flrm size ~ 6.222 ~ 1.630.....: -0.0 I : 0.33*: I • ; 
:-o:oJ:O.22* . --.. _- ._. -.- ---4.Board size 4.392 1.887: -0.09 I 
,--- '-;;-1 ~28* I -0.05 1 -oj 5: 1 0.14* T - ! r - ._-- r - -1- --S.CEO duality f-0.12(! 4 0.32'H ! I I L_ I - _1_ --. ._--6.DTA 0.2.4~ _L!2:.~ -0.06 I , , -Q.02 ~:_Q:l_L! 0:02 i ; --~ :._._ .... _._.!--_ .. _-
7.CEO aRe 54.86 6.653: -0.30* : 0.15* 0.21* -0.04 0.18* -0.05 I 
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Table 3.2 reports the means, standard deviations and Pearson correlations of all 
observed variables in the regression. The CEO involuntary turnover type is significantly 
correlated with two independent variables, FF A and NE. Involuntary turnover also 
significantly correlates with most of our control variables related to performance and 
power. No serious multicollinearity problem has been detected so far, since no correlation 
of two or more predictors was greater than 0.4. 
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Table 3.3: logit model of CEO turnover types 
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Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, + p<O.l * p<0.05 ** p<O.Ol. The reported coefficients in the 
table are unstandardized; dummies variables are omitted. 
Table 3.3 reports the results of logit models of CEO turnover type using maximum 
likelihood estimations. The maximum likelihood (MLE) is the preferred estimator 
especially for our small sample size (N) 100) (Long and Freese, 2006). The analytic 
structure is: Model (1 )-is a baseline model which includes only control variables. Model (2) 
includes all control variables and FFA. Model (3) includes all control variables and CEOs' 
NE. Model (4) is the full model including all control variables, FF A and NE together. 
Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of coefficients. The significant p-values of 
Wald statistical tests of all four models are less than .01, helping us to reject the null 
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hypotheses that all of the coefficients are equal to zero. These indicators show that the 
independent variables of four models have significant effects on determining a CEO 
involuntary turnover. The Pseudo R-squares demonstrate that by either adding our 
independent variables one by one separately or together simultaneously, the goodness of 
fit of models (2), (3) and (4) are increased significantly compared with the baseline model. 
The final model (4) has the best explanatory power to classify two types of CEO exit. 
When there is a positive regression coefficient, the transformed log value will be 
greater than one. It means that the modeled event is more likely to occur. In contrast, when 
negative coefficients transformed log value is less than one, the odds of an event occurring 
will decrease. We discover that some prior recognized variables (control variables), i.e. 
CEO duality, CEO age and years, worked in the firm have negatively significant impacts 
on the likelihood of CEO dismissal against the voluntary turnover across four models. 
These fit well with our original assumptions that they will reduce the CEO involuntary 
turnover possibility in the total turnover cases. 
In the logit model, the natural logarithm of odd ratios (...!!....) of a CEO being forced 
l-p 
out is a dependent variable in this regression equation. The coefficients represent the 
influences on the logarithmic odds ratios of involuntary turnover versus voluntary 
turnover. Hypotheses I and 2 suggest that a higher level of old CEOs' FFA predicts 
voluntary turnover and a high level of old CEOs' NE predicts involuntary turnover, 
respectively. The coefficients of our independent variables, FF A and NE, are significant in 
the proposed directions; the findings support both hypotheses. These relationships were 
consistent across the model (2), (3) and (4) as well. 
In the final model (4) PMLE in Table 3.4 shows that if negative emotion increases 
the log-odds-ratio of CEO involuntary turnover will increase 1.269; and if the FF A 
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increases 1, the log-odds-ratio of CEO involuntary turnover will decrease 0.948. It is 
difficult to interpret the results of J1MLE. To understand the coefficients of logged odds 
ratios by logit models better, we transform the logged odds ratios into their impacts on 
probabilities: the marginal effects of FFA and NE on involuntary turnover. We can 
explain how our independent variables influence the CEO dismissal probability via 
marginal effects using the equation below: 
M . 1 h iJPr(y=llx) argma c ange = 
iJxk 
These relationships between probability of involuntary CEO turnover and FF A and 
NE are nonlinear, the tangent to the probability curve will illustrate these effects. In the 
final model (4), the overallx2 - model's goodness of fit is 45.97***. For the final model, 
we use the "mfx" program in ST A TA to calculate the marginal effects of future focus and 
negative emotion on the probability of dismissal and holding all the variables at their 
means. The marginal effects are -0.227 and 0.304, respectively. This means that that one 
unit change in these two variables will significantly change the probability of involuntary 
turnover by -0.227 and 0.304, respectively. 
Apart from the Pseudo R-squares which are displayed in Table 3.3, we also 
checked the BIC results to measure the fit of our models using the "fitstat" program in 
STAT A. The ~BIC difference between the full model and the baseline is 5.344, which 
shows good evidence (Raftery, 1995) of improvement. Our final model works well to 
predict the CEO succession types and can explain the difference between involuntary and 
voluntary turnover samples. With "soft" and "hot" factors, the explanatory power of our 
model for CEO turnover type has been increased, or in other words, including cognition 
and emotion of old CEOs in the regression can achieve a better model fit. 
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Table 3.4: The classification accuracy of the logit regression model 
Classification I Predicted I 
I Dismissal I Non-dismissal I Total 
Observed Dismissal 1._ ••. _ ..•..••• 1J .. ~ .. ..... ........ _ ........... n .. ' 104 
Correctly predicted dismissal i 74.040/0 1 1 
I-'N:....:..=.con:.:..--=d=is=m=is=s=al~~_~~-,----__ ~_ .......... _._..!.~_.' ..... _ ...... __ .... _ ... ~._i 
Correctly predicted non-dismissal I I 70.97% I 
62 
Overall Total ; 95 i 71 i !--=-==-----,-----,----------I.. ..................... , ............................... _ .. . 
Correctly classified i 77 i 44 i 
166 
121 Correct classification rate , ................ _ .... , ........................... ······1 72.89% 
To evaluate the quality and utility of our final model, Table 3.4 provides the 
classification accuracy results comparing the predicted involuntary/voluntary turnover 
memberships based on our logit models with the actual fact. Our model can 74.04% 
correctly predict the CEO involuntary turnover and 70.97% correctly predict voluntary 
CEO succession. The overall classification accuracy rate is 72.89%. Operationally, the 
overall classification accuracy rate should be 25% or higher than the proportional by 
chance accuracy rate. The threshold accuracy of a good model here is 63.81 %. 
[ 
95 2 71 2] 
1.25 x (166) + (166) x 100% = 63.81 % 
The classification accuracy of our model is 9.08% higher than the threshold 
accuracy of a satisfied model by chance. Compared with some similar studies such as 
Cannella (1994) and Hatfield et al (1999), the accuracy rates of their results are around 
60%; few previous studies reach accuracy above 70%. We believe that the quality of our 
logit model is good with a relative higher accuracy rate. 
3.6. Disclissions and Conclusions 
Existing studies widely treat the old CEO as a passive player in determining 
hislher mode of exit. Lack of research has investigated the importance of the 
psychological factors of the old CEOs, particularly their emotion in the leadership 
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transition period. This study was motivated by the need to address these theoretical gaps in 
the CEO succession literature. 
Although by definition it depends on old CEOs" will to separate two different 
types of exit, voluntary and involuntary turnovers, previous studies neglect the old CEOs' 
initiative. To fill this blank, we adopted a dual channel platform integrating both cognition 
and emotion to test the importance of old CEOs' psychological factors in leading to 
different types of CEO exit. We propose that the level of old CEOs' FFA, signaling the 
planned career management behaviors will increase the likelihood of voluntary turnover 
compared to involuntary turnover. We also propose that the level of old CEOs' NE, 
reflecting the noncooperation between old CEOs and BoDs, will increase the likelihood of 
involuntary turnover compared to the voluntary turnover. The empirical findings provide 
robust support to these claims by considering them in the logit models individually or by 
considering them together in the final model. In our research context, old CEOs' power, 
proxy as CEO duality, age and years worked for the companies remain their significant 
influence in increasing the likelihood of voluntary turnover across all models. After 
considering our focal constructs, FFA, NE or both respectively, the firm performance lost 
its significant impact on reducing the likelihood of involuntary turnover compared with 
voluntary turnover. This implies that the importance of prior performance will be diluted 
after considering the effects of old CEOs because it is down to how old CEOs' appreciate 
and respond to it. Hence, FF A and NE can grasp more explanatory power. 
This study contributes to the current literature in CEO succession as follows. 1) 
From a theoretical vie.w, current CEO succession literature emphasizes the environmental 
and economic rational decision of BoDs and treats old CEOs as passive objects in 
determining the types of their exit. This study introduces the integration of an executive 
- 51-
career management perspective and appreciates the proactive roles old CEOs play in the 
leadership transition process; 2) from an empirical view, based on the dual channel theory, 
this study provides strong evidence for the importance of old CEO's psychological factors, 
particularly emotion as a widely ignored element in explaining the dichotomy of CEO 
turnover types; 3) the majority of extant CEO succession studies were conducted in the 
USA and this study can serve as a supplement in the new geographic area. 
For future research, by taking into consideration old CEOs' proactive roles in the 
succession process, it will better to conduct some supplemental qualitative research such 
as collecting data from interviews from both old CEOs and BoDs. Further investigation of 
the interactions between old CEOs and BoDs in their meetings and communications will 
help us discover more robust evidence and interesting stories behind this process. 
In conclusion, previous research into CEO turnover has ignored the old CEOs' 
initiative. This study offers an alternative view by investigating old CEOs' willingness to 
step down using their FF A and NE which advanced our knowledge in this field. 
- 52-
Chapter 4. Essay Two: The impacts of new CEOs' psychological 
factors on post-succession strategic change 
ABSTRACT: 
I use the psycholinguistic content analysis methods to investigate how new CEOs' 
psychological factors influence the post-succession strategic changes (PSSC) of firms in 
the FTSE All-Share index. Taking the trilogy-of-mind perspective, on top of cognition, I 
advocate that new CEOs' emotion and conation serve as the impetus for the PSSC. By 
tracing the identical new CEOs over years after their succession in a non-experimental 
field study, the empirical results of this longitudinal study demonstrate that those intra-
individual psychological (time-varying) factors of new CEOs are important for the PSSc. 
New CEOs' future focus attention (FFA), commitment to change (C2C), will significantly 
increase the PSSC and the new CEOs' negative emotion (NE) will significantly reduce the 
PSSC. The paper claims that incorporating more comprehensive factors in new CEOs' 
trilogy of mind can help us get a better picture for the mechanism behind PSSc. 
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4.1. Introduction: 
Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1997) define a strategic change as the difference in 
form, quality and state of an organizational entity's alignment with its external 
environment over time, i.e. the fundamental pattern of present and planned resource 
deployments (Hofer and Schendel, 1978). It can happen in both the content and the 
process of strategies. From a reactive point of view, a firm's strategies are forced to 
change by its environment. However, it is people who make the difference. We also have 
to consider factors within a firm, particularly the characteristics and the mind of its CEO. 
When facing similar challenges in the environment, firms respond differently due to their 
managers' particular inspirations and decisions. CEOs' capabilities to make appropriate 
strategic changes (the right direction, the right scope, the right degree and at the right time) 
are the major sources of competitive advantage for a firm. 
The CEO succession is an important event in the history of any company and is a 
potential trigger for strategic change (Miller, 1993). Previous studies show that new CEOs 
will initiate substantial strategic change upon taking office, particularly when they have 
different mind-sets from their predecessors (Shen and Cannella, 2002, ZUNIGA-Vicentea et 
aI., 2005). CEO succession opens a window through which we can examine differences in 
the mind-set between the predecessor and successor. It also gives us a chance to explore 
how a new CEO's mentality, i.e. the intra-individual (time varying) differences within 
identical new CEOs change in the following years. 
Although there is vast literature on strategic change, only a small number of 
empirical studies have focused in the context of CEO succession (Hutzschenreuter et aI., 
2012). The nature of the strategic change after a CEO succession has not been sufficiently 
explored. The basic assumptions of the current literature are rooted in 'bounded rationale' 
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(Simon, 1955) and in the Upper Echelon Theory (UET) which deems managers having 
strong impacts on the strategic choices of their firms (Child, 1972, Hambrick and Mason, 
1984). However, managers have only a limited capacity to handle all the information in 
their environment (Cyert and March, 1963); they normally have to impose a cognitive 
map, a mental template for transforming a complex informational environment into a 
tractable one. Hence, CEOs' cognitive limitations and differing cognitive maps will 
influence their strategic decision-making. 
Current psychological studies predominantly focus on "cold cognition" in which 
affect plays little role (Anderson, 1996, Forgas, 1995), while emotion and conation (a 
commitment pathway from intention to action (Snow, 1989, Heckhausen and Kuhl, 1985) 
have been broadly ignored (Reitan and Wolfson, 2000, Hannah et aI., 2011). Accordingly, 
cognitive psychology has been the most widely employed perspective for understanding 
the mechanism of post-succession strategic change (PSSC). 
Current cognition dominated research in the field will hamper the development of 
studies in PSSc. By incorporating previously ignored factors in the trilogy of mind 
(Hilgard, 1980, Mayer et at, 1997), i.e. emotion and conation into the models, we expect 
to have a better understanding of the phenomenon. Different from existing research which 
mainly investigates the cognitive differences between predecessors and successors, this 
paper intends to look at the intra-individual (time-varying) differences within the identical 
new CEOs. This study attempts to demonstrate the importance in the change of a CEO's 
psychological factors, i.e. cognition, emotion and conation, for the PSSc. 
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4.2. Literature review 
Strategic changes have been seen as important reasons for the survival and success 
of organizations (Cho and Hambrick, 2006). Normally, we can categorize the antecedents 
of PSSC from both internal and external angles. For those factors that initiate strategic 
changes from within new leaders, we call them internal causes; factors that induce 
strategic changes externally in new leaders are external causes (Hutzschenreuter et aI., 
2012). Prior research has focused on how external factors such as environmental pressure 
and the technical dynamic and turbulent industry characteristics (Gordon et aI., 2000) 
impact on strategic changes. More and more studies address the importance of internal 
issues such as CEOs' cognition (Walsh, 1995), information processing and decision-
making (Wiersema, 1992, Wiersema, 1995), learning activities (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 
1997), and openness to change (Datta et aI., 2003). Managers' perceptions of the necessity 
of strategic changes should be the first step towards those changes (Cho and Hambrick, 
2006); without such an awareness, external environments are irrelevant to the organization. 
In previous studies, cognitive differences and cognitive rigidity are two main 
reasons to explain post-succession strategic change (PSSC). First, the cognitive 
differences between the successor and the predecessor is the key internal antecedent 
(Hutzschenreuter et aI., 2012, Boeker, 1997a, Boeker, 1997b). Second, new CEOs have 
less of a burden of cognitive rigidity. New CEOs may not be so committed to prior 
strategic directions because they did not hold responsibility for the old strategies (Datta et 
aI., 2003). As such, they can carry out immediate strategic changes to protect the old 
strategies (Lant et aI., 1992); (Romanelli and Tushman, 1994, Wiersema, 1992). Thus, 
they can easily adjust the firms' strategies to realign them with the new environment. 
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According to the trilogy-of-mind theory, there are three key categories in human 
psychology: cognition (thought); affect (feeling); and conation (desire) (Hilgard, 1980). 
Cognition is the information processing part of human psychological functioning (Walsh, 
1995); emotion is subjective and conscious, as a transient intense state and reaction to an 
event, person or entity (Rajah et aI., 2011); and conation is the aspect of the mental 
process that elicits and directs behavior and action (Huitt and Cain, 2005). Researchers 
have suggested that cognition, emotion and conation are three distinct functions within the 
brain (Reitan and Wolfson, 2000). Although cognition is a very important concept in 
psychology, particularly in representational models and computations (Stubbart, 1989), it 
is not the only component of the human mind. Based on its analogy with information 
processing logic, as with mathematical calculation and inference, cognition is too "cold" 
(Abelson and Clarke, 1963, Redlawsk, 2002). To paraphrase a well-known quotation, the 
wish is the father to the thought, and we are slaves to our emotions (Damasio, 1994). We 
might expect thoughts and decisions to be influenced by an individual's conation and 
emotion. 
If we emphasize a time primarily within understanding, feeling or intention, some 
components of the total experience are subordinated, and the psychological reality is 
incomplete. Not until recently did researchers start to realize the importance of affect and 
conation on leaders' behaviors and organizational changes (Szabla, 2007, Johnson, 2008, 
Piderit, 2000). Furthermore, these psychological factors are time-varying within 
individuals. Following on from this realization, we propose that if we can integrate these 
fundamental psychological elements, particularly the intra-individual differences of the 
trilogy, we will have a better scheme by which to illuminate the mechanisms underlying 
PSSC. 
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4.3. Hypotheses development 
4.3.1. Cognition 
The main purpose of strategic management is to plan for the future (Mosakowski 
and Earley, 2000). Future focus attention (FF A) is an important cognition for CEOs and is 
defined as the amount of attention devoted to events that are yet to occur (Yadav et aJ., 
2007, Chandy, 2010). In a succession context, it reflects new CEOs' expectations about 
the future destinies of their companies. These expectations shape the way of their strategic 
management. The current rent stream will be corroded in the future (Mahoney and 
Pandian, 1992); therefore, after inception, the new CEOs' FFA is important for companies 
to achieve sustainability and create dynamic capability. Future focus has a change-
orientated nature; hence, it makes new CEOs realize their firms' limitations in current 
capability and knowledge and makes them promote learning activities. New CEOs' FFA 
will dissolve the firms' rigidity and inertia from past experiences. With greater future 
focus in the new CEOs' attention, firms are more adaptive and flexible; thus, new CEOs 
will respond to the environmental challenges with sophistication. FF A helps new CEOs 
identify and interpret the developmental trends. Perceptions of novel uncertainties and 
upcoming issues for the firms are generated from new CEOs' FF A. Future focused new 
CEOs will develop more detailed scenarios and alternative solutions for the problems that 
firms are facing. Therefore, they can conduct strategic changes to conquer these 
difficulties. 
In psychology, the attention to future consequences will increase people's locus of 
control and lead to an achievement in motivation (Strathman et aI., 1994). Therefore, we 
believe that new CEOs' FFA will increase their control over their new positions in the 
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finns and make them more motivated to speed up the strategic changes. We suggest that 
highly future focused new CEOs can bring more changes in their companies. 
Researchers studying the psychology of rehabilitation found that patients with 
future orientated thinking will reduce their stress and cope better with the difficult time 
(Holman and Silver, 1998). A new CEO's FFA as an indicator shows that he/she does not 
get stuck in the power transition process and signals that he/she is able to deal with the 
unforeseeable painful shocks in the new position. Future orientation gives people wings to 
soar to new heights of achievement (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999). Future orientated focus 
will more actively attend to emerging infonnation about the competitive contexts, 
resulting in greater degrees of change in 'high tech' startups (West Iii and Meyer, 1997). 
Future orientation generates some optimistic predictions (Buehler et aI., 2005), 
(Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). These optimistic projected claims will be more likely to 
make the top management teams (TMTs) and boards of directors (BoDs) agree to facilitate 
the strategic changes and new CEOs will also be more likely to win the support of 
employees. FF A is a curial component of temporal self-regulation theory (Hall and Fong, 
2007). FF A will help people deal with stress, prevent adversity and generate proactive 
efforts (Aspinwall, 2005). Being in a future focused state, new CEOs are more self-
regulated, motivated and disciplined. We believe that new CEOs' FF A can help them 
achieve better preparations for alternatives, better planning and problem solving; it assists 
them to create an optimistic atmosphere and motivate others to take action for change. To 
sum up, we generate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between new CEOs' future focus 
attention and the post-succession strategic change. New CEOs . future focus attention will 
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influence the post-succession strategic change: an increase in the future focus attention 
will increase the degree of strategic changes; a decrease in future focus attention will 
decrease the degree of strategic changes. 
4.3.2. Emotion 
Researchers have found that people's feelings and moods have a direct effect on 
their behavior (Forgas and George, 2001). We argue that the emotions of new CEOs will 
not only influence their own abilities, attitudes, leadership styles, and power in PSSC, but 
also other people's roles in changing the firms' strategies. 
Negative emotion (NE) influences one's information processing (Forgas, 1995, 
Baron, 2008). We believe that NE will influence both the affective judgment and cognitive 
judgment systems of new CEOs implicitly and explicitly. NEs reduce the substitute 
alertness and also narrow one's perceptual fields (Baron, 1998). NE reduces the frequency 
and quality of social contact between decision-makers and the external world. For this 
reason, it decreases the number of alternative strategic options for firms. In this research, 
negative moods will make new CEOs less likely to ask for help from consultants and 
external people for advice. Thus, NE decreases the possibility of initiating and 
implementing strategic change. In contrast, less NE in new CEOs is associated with 
charismatic leadership (Johnson, 2009), which will potentially enhance PSSc. 
The relationships between negative affect and attribution styles are important 
(Weiner, 1995). The negative affect of new CEOs will lead them to believe that there are 
bigger and more pervasive problems in the firms (Ford and Baucus, 1987). Therefore, it 
will make them lose confidence and give up any attempt to make strategic changes. 
Furthermore, with NEs, new CEOs will generate a negative attitude towards their new job. 
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They will feel uncomfortable, helpless and hopeless, and become inactive in their new 
position. 
Leaders' displayed emotion is very important for the interactions among team 
members (Liu and Maitlis, 2012). Leaders who express NEs tend to be rated lower by 
team members as being less effective (Gaddis et aI., 2004, Lewis, 2000). As the new 
leader of the company, a new CEO with NEs (psycholinguistic signals in CEO 
shareholder letters) will receive low respect and rating from hislher colleagues, 
subordinates and other stakeholders. 
The NEs of new CEOs will generate low emotional energy (Collins, 1990, Collins, 
2004), which makes them depressed, lack the initiative to make an effort, and low 
solidarity and finally, they might be alienated by other people in the company. As with 
viruses, moods and emotions spread among people and this phenomenon is called 
emotional cognation (Rapson et aI., 1993). New CEOs' emotions will spread through the 
organizations; the NEs of new CEOs can distort members' relationships through the 
spread of negative energy among the group (Barsade, 2002). Other TMT members and 
employees of the firms will also have negative moods by contagion. Bad moods will lead 
to uncooperative behaviors (Hertel et aI., 2000). NEs displayed by a new CEO produce 
problems such as diminishing top team participation and cooperation (Kisfalvi and Pitcher, 
2003); generating feelings of helplessness and frustration, preventing valuable discussion 
(Smith and Edmondson, 2006); altering the power and status relations among board 
members (Brundin and Nordqvist, 2008). All these above will hamper the implementation 
of strategic changes. Based on the discussions above, we produce the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2: Negative emotions of new CEOs will negatively associate with the 
degree of post-succession strategic change; an increased level in the negative emotion 
will decrease the degree of post-succession strategic change and a decreased level in the 
negative emotion will increase the degree of post-succession strategic change. 
4.3.3. Conation/Intention 
Conation is a commitment pathway from intention to action (Snow, 1989, 
Heckhausen and Kuhl, 1985). Conation includes motivation (initiate) and volition (insist) 
from wishes to wants, from intentions to actions. Conation ignites people's motives to do 
something and it also maintains people's volition to make sure things happen as planned. 
Datta et al. (Datta et aI., 2003) found that new CEOs' openness to change will decrease 
strategic persistence. Openness to change in their research is defined as a cognitive 
characteristic, proxy by their demographic indicators, representing being less bound to 
existing routines and assumptions. Researchers in cognitive schools rarely separated 
managerial cognition and managerial actions towards strategic changes (Rajagopalan and 
Spreitzer, 1997). We believe that conations acting as the pathways to action in our 
research can fill this gap. 
Salancik (1977) defines commitment as the blinding of an individual to behavioral 
acts. Commitment to Change (C2C) is an action commitment; it is not directed to static 
entities such as teams or organizations. Prior research has treated it as the employees' 
attachment to the implementation of new work rules, policy programs, budgets, 
technologies and so forth (Jaros, 2010). C2C is a reflection of the internalization of a 
change program. It is to examine people's willingness to support the change. Fedor et al. 
(2006) believe that C2C is an individual's conation to act on behalf of the changes. It 
reflects people's belief, desire, and obligation towards changes in organizations 
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(Herscovitch and Meyer, 2002). In our study, C2C is a CEO-level construct which 
demonstrates the intention of new CEOs to initiate and implement strategic changes. 
Intentions are a representation of commitment due to their established association 
with actual behaviors (Ajzen, 1987). We need to understand CEOs' intentions for strategic 
changes. In other words, to carry out strategic change, new CEOs must have the intention 
to do so. The conation perspective suggests that whether or not an action will be taken 
depends on an individual's intentions. The higher degree of conation, the more likely 
strategic cognition will be converted into strategic action. 
We need to understand people's desire and belief about their actions. New CEOs' 
C2C will show their motivation to push forward the strategic change. Thus, the higher the 
degree of C2C a new CEO has, the more motivated he/she will be and the more likely 
he/she will put it into action. The C2C of a new CEO also shows his/her volition towards 
strategic changes. It infuses vigilant monitoring for the implementation of strategic change. 
To conclude, we develop the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: An increase in a new CEO's commitment to change will generate a 
greater degree of post-succession strategic change; a decrease in a new CEO's 
commitment to change will decrease the degree of post-succession strategic change 
Based on our discussion above, the trilogy-of-mind theory promotes a wider view 
to study human mental functions. If we emphasize a time primarily within understanding 
or feeling or intention, some components of the total experience are being subordinated, 
and the psychological reality is incomplete. Not until recently have researchers started to 
realize the importance of affect and conation for leaders' behaviors and organizational 
changes (Szabla, 2007, Johnson, 2008, Piderit, 2000). Thus, we propose that if we can 
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integrate these three distinctive psychological elements, we can understand the mechanism 
behind PSSC better. 
4.4. Methods 
4.4.1. Research design 
This research is a longitudinal study and has three goals: (1) to improve the 
theoretical understanding of PSSC and new CEOs' psychological changes; (2) to make 
methodological advancements by applying psycholinguistic content analysis and panel 
data models in strategic management; and (3) to extend PSSC studies to a geographical 
area (non-US) which prior research has not yet covered. We attempt to take a more 
comprehensive view of new CEOs' psychology for a better understanding of the PSSC 
mechanism. The results will bring us some insight into internal driven PSSc. 
We selected the companies from the FTSE All-Abare Index 16 based on the criteria 
below: I) the CEO succession took place from 2002 to 2007; 2) non-financial and non-
utility industrial firms only; 3) both BoD and CEOs' information was available; and 4) 
CEOs' shareholder letters were available for the next 3 continuous years after the 
succession. Because of the data availability of some key variables, the final model in fixed 
effects analysis contains 116 companies in total. Within these companies, the average age 
of new CEOs in the succession year is 49.16 years. The number of directors on the board 
ranges from 2 to 9. These companies had 17,676 in the average employee number and 
£3,913 million in the average annual revenue. Only publicly traded companies were 
included because we needed to obtain the CEOs' psychological factors from the results of 
a psycholinguistic content analysis of CEOs' letters to shareholders. Table 4.5 provides 
16 The top 600s companies in the FTSE (Financial Times and the london Stock Exchange). 
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the definitions, the constructs and variables, the measurements (operationalization), and 
the data sources used for this research. 
Table 4_5: Summary of Measures and Sources 
Constructs/definitions Variables Operationalization ~ources 
Outcome construct: 
Strategic change (variation) The difference between ~loomberg Strategic changes: 
actual resource ~lB/Datastream 
iilllocation and predicted 
patterns in time series 
lFocal constructs: 'FFA ~ords related to future EO shareholder 
Future focused attention: ~he amount of a new CEO's n a text From the LIWC etters 
~ttention devoted to objects esults 
~nd things that are yet to 
- - -
- - -
~!l~ ________________ r------- ---------
Wegotive emotion: WE ~ords about negative 
~he intensity of the negative ~motions in the CEO 
eelings/moods expressed by etter. From the LIWC 
~eV'! CE9~ _________ esults 
- - -
- - f-=-------- -- -----
Commitment to Change r2C Words related to 
The willingness and change. extracted from 
'ntention of new CEOs to he content analysis 
'nitiate and implement results according to a 
strategic changes C2C dictionary we 
developed 
Controlled important 
constructs in prior ROA Firms' performance ~lB 




Boardex rEO ownership iNew CEOs' equity 
pwnership ratio in the Bloomberg 
IrEOpower whole BoDs 
lfJoard size Number of directors 
K:-EOa.qe Age of the new CEOs 
pther control factors "Firm size Logarithm of firms' total TlB 
employee number Bloomberg 
~/ack resources urrent ratio = (current 
assets/ 
~urrent liabilities)*100 
Environmental he annual growth rate 
Dynamism pf industry total sales 
Time effects ~ear dummies 
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-1.4.2. Key constructs and variable measurements 
4.4.2.1. Focal const,.ucts (Dependent va riabJes) 
To capture the construct of strategic changes, we use the firms' strategic resource 
allocation profile (SRAP) as developed by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990), which is 
composed of multiple dimensions of the firm's decision pattern. The original SRAP 
included six ratios.1 7 If these SRAP ratios change over time, this indicates the occurrence 
of strategic change within a company (Carpenter, 2000) and reflects the historical pattern 
of a firm's activities. However, for these six ratios, many firms, particularly those in 
Europe, did not normally report information about their R&D, advertising intensity, or 
inventory level. To overcome the missing data problems due to this lack of reporting, we 
adopted a method recommended by Haynes and Hillman (2010). We used three ratios, 
specifically, plant and equipment upgrades, SGA overhead, and financial leverage, to 
describe the concept of strategic change. IS Strategic variation is to represent the changes in 
the strategy. We calculated it using a combination of exponential smoothing and 
Euclidean distance measures. Exponential smoothing allows us to place more significance 
on the more recent observations, whilst also incorporating information gained from 
previous years (Wooldridge, 2009). We chose a four-year window of historical resource 
allocation figures to establish the pattern of variation within each firm, since it is long 
enough to capture strategic change, yet brief enough to exclude changes in the external 
environment that could not be incorporated into the study (Haynes and Hillman, 2010). 
17 I) The advertising expenses/sales ratio; 2) the research and development (R&D) expenses/sales ratio; 3) 
the net plant and equipment/gross plant and equipment ratio; 4) the selling, general, and administrative 
(SGA) expenses/sales ratio; 5) the working capital management and production cycle (inventory/sales) ratio; 
and 6) the financial leverage (debt/equity) ratio. 
IK To evaluate the reliability of our three-ratio approach, we also examined the results obtained using 4 ratios 
(the three above ratios plus a supplementary one) and 5 ratios (plus two supplementary ones) when we found 
the results obtained in all cases to be similar and equally robust). 
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Using time series data, I examined the four-year historical pattern of change in 
each of the three SRAP ratios to predict their respective value in the 5th year; that is, 
ratios in T-3, T-2, T-l and T were used to forecast the predicted value in T+l; and the 
di fferences between actual figure and the predicted value in T + 1 are the strategic 
variations to describe the changes of the resource allocation pattern. After applying the 
exponential smoothing technique to each of three resource allocation ratios, we summed 
the absolute value in percentages of difference between actual figures and predicted 
figures to gain a compo sited strategic variation measure. The summed difference is the 
dependent variable, strategic changes (variation) of each year. 
4.4.2.2. Focal constructs (independent variables generated from the CATA) 
CEOs' letters and statements filed in annual reports provided the raw data for our 
three key variables, specifically, future focused attention (FFA), negative emotion (NE), 
and commitment to change (C2C). We relied on two methods to extract the data variables. 
To extract the variables to examine FF A and NE, we used the predefined psycholinguistic 
program LIWC (language inquiry word count) (Pennebaker et aI., 2007) To extract the 
variables to examine C2C, we developed a C2C dictionary, a list of words reflecting an 
intention to change strategy, based on a similar approach recommended by McClelland 
(2010). 
LIWC has been demonstrated to be a valid and reliable tool for measuring 
individuals' psychological characteristics and states in the language disclosure process 
(Pennebaker and Francis, 1996). LIWC has been validated by having human evaluators 
rate the emotion and cognition content of thousands of texts (Pennebaker and King, 1999). 
Even given the use of irony, sarcasm and unusual sentence structure in company texts, 
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LIWC is still a useful tool for gauging the emotional state, intention, and cognition of the 
writers. 
Measuring new CEOs' FF A 
Future focused attention is measured using the future tense category dictionary in 
the LIWC which includes 48 words such as will, might, shall, and 'gonna'. For each letter 
or statement, it reports the amount of CEO attention devoted to events and what has yet to 
occur (Yadav et aI., 2007). 
Measuring new CEO's NE 
LIWC's built-in negative emotion dictionary comprises 345 words (including, for 
example, hate, worthless, enemy, fear, anger and sadness) that reflect the intensity of the 
new CEOs' negative feelings and emotions. When Tausczik and Pennebaker (2010) 
analyzed the results generated by LIWC from text materials (.txt computer file), they 
found it produced negative emotion scores that reliably reflected the intensity of the 
authors' negative emotions in each letter from each year. 
Measuring new CEOs' C2C 
We measured new CEOs' commitment to change by analyzing the content of new 
CEOs' shareholder letters in the 3 years after their succession. Content analysis is a useful 
method for identifying specific characteristics within texts from which to draw valid 
inferences. The fundamental assumption of content analysis is language's ability to reflect 
peoples' cognition, attitude, belief and intention (Harwood and Garry, 2003, Duriau et aI., 
2007). We used a quantitative approach that computed the frequency of "change related" 
keyword counts in CEO shareholder letters. The frequency of particular words indicates 
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the importance and centrality of the underlying construct they represent. Following a two-
stage procedure recommended by McClelland (20 I 0) to measure CEO commitment to the 
status quo, we developed a commitment to change (C2C) dictionary. Words in the C2C 
dictionary were rated on a continuous scale from low to high, which showed the level of 
new CEOs' commitment/intention to implement changes in their company's strategy. 
Development of the C2C dictionary involved two stages. A preliminary word list 
representing a high level of commitment to change was developed first because I expected 
that CEOs would like to communicate with shareholders and attempt to get their support 
for the changes in strategy. Two people coded the data and independently read through the 
CEO shareholder letters of 6 companies randomly selected from my sample; the two 
coders (coder CD and coder ®) were myself and an English native speaker, respectively. 
For each of the first three companies, coder CD read 3 letters written by the same new 
CEOs over a continuous three-year period, 9 letters in all. This approach enabled him to 
gain some insights not only into which words represent commitment to change, but also 
into the degree of commitment expressed in each letter, and the extent to which it 
fluctuated over this 3-year period. We had decided to focus particularly on verbs to do 
with motion because we found that they were often used when describing a change in 
strategy. After reading the 9 CEO letters, coder CD generated a list of the words frequently 
used to describe the changes. Coder ® then read another 9 letters from 3 other companies 
using the list of words developed by coder CD, and determined the extent to which those 
words were employed to describe changes in strategy. In this way, coder ® developed a 
list of new words which had not been selected by coder CD. Then, based on the two word 
lists, an open discussions between the two coders helped them to reach a preliminary 
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consensus, and full agreement was reached only after more letters had been confirmed to 
have used the same words to express commitment to change. 
The second stage involved running some tests to evaluate this beta version of the 
C2C dictionary developed in the stage 1. For this test, we took some CEO letters that were 
not in this study for such a test. The results were brainstormed by a group of students that 
included some whose first language was not English, which helped the researchers further 
refine the C2C dictionary. The improved version of the C2C dictionary included verbs 
such as change, create, initiate, modify, innovate, transform, and experiment. Using word~ 
stems in the C2C dictionary, the entire raw data-set was analyzed using the text searching 
program. This enabled us to capture all instances of the character strings representing the 
dictionary words in their various forms. For example, words such as "changes", "change", 
"changed" and "changing" were all taken into account. Eventually, the percentage of 
words in each CEO shareholder letter using C2C words can be used to describe the level 
of the new CEOs' C2C in a specific year. 
4.4.2.3. Control variables 
For the firm's characteristics, as discussed in the theory and hypothesis sections, 
poor prior performance may result in a change in strategy by the new CEOs. Therefore, to 
control for this factor, we used return on assets (ROA). We also controlled for size of firm 
because we expect that bigger firms will have a greater inertia towards changes in strategy. 
It is more difficult for a big firm to change its strategies. We used the logarithm of 
employee number to represent firm size. We controlled for the available slack resource of 
the finn for new CEOs, measured as the current ratio [(current assets - inventory)/current 
liabilities]. This is commonly used to evaluate corporate financial conditions (Stickney 
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and Brown, 1999). The more available slack resources give new CEOs some flexibility to 
play around as such strategic changes will be more common for the firms. 
For external factors, the rapidity of environmental changes may also affect the 
uncertainty and the need for changes perceived by CEOs (West and Meyer, 1997). We 
considered the effects of dynamic environments by controlling for the instability of the 
industry conditions each year (calculated as the annual growth rate of industry total sales) 
(Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001). We also controlled the year effects by using dummy 
variables. 
For management characteristics, we controlled for some of the important factors 
that influence the capability of new CEOs to make the changes happen. New CEOs sit on 
the top of the organizations; therefore, they have the official position of power. We 
controlled for the size of BoDs, i.e. the total number of directors (Zajac and Westphal, 
1996), as an important corporate governance factor that we expect will influence the way 
in which new CEOs play their role. To measure new CEOs' power, as recommended by 
Haynes and Hillman (2010), we used a proxy, the proportion of CEOs' equity ownership 
within that of the whole BoDs. It reflects the importance of a new CEO and the control 
he/she has compared to other board members. We expect that the more power a new CEO 
has, the more likely that he/she will be able to generate strategic changes for the company. 
We also included other characteristics indicative of a new CEOs' power such as the new 
CEOs' age. We expected that it would positively correlate to strategic changes. 
To represent the causality, we chose to use the one year forward value of strategic 
variation as the dependent variable (F. Strategic change) in the model. Equivalently, 
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strategic changes will be predicted by the values of all the independent and controlled 
variables one year before. 
4.5. Data analysis 
To test our hypotheses better, we applied fixed effects models to analyze the 
longitudinal data. Fixed effect (FE) models can help us control for all possible 
characteristics of an individual even without measuring them as long as the characteristics 
do not change over time (time-invariant). Unlike the approaches used in other studies 
(Kaplan, 2008, Eggers and Kaplan, 2009, Yadav et a1., 2007), (Antonakis et a1., 2010), FE 
models are very useful because in the context of post-succession strategic changes, we 
followed the same new CEDs rather than different CEOs through their post-succession 
.142; (2) FFA is .164; (3) NE is .169; (4) C2C is .158; and (5) full is .226. The difference 
R w 
of 2 between the final full modethe identical new CEOs. 
When studying panel data, an FE model has better estimation to explain and 
predict complicated human behaviors correctly; it allows researchers to be more confident 
about their causality claims (Vandenberg, 2002, Cameron, 2005, Hsiao, 2003). FE models 
help us solve out the endogeneity problem generated from the unobserved heterogeneity. 
FE models assume that regressors are correlated with their individual effect. It 
decomposes the error term and eliminates the individual effect, thus making the regressors 
exogenous again. The attraction of the FE model is the consistent estimation of parameters, 
assuming that the unobserved heterogeneity is additive, even if the regressors are 
endogenous (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, Cameron, 2005). 
Rather than placing undue emphasis on cognition alone, the main purpose of this 
study was to examine the importance of the largely neglected psychological elements of 
emotion and intention in explaining PSSC. By appropriately controlling for other earlier-
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recognized important factors, an FE model can help us jointly investigate variables from 
different theoretical viewpoints (Tuggle et aI., 2010). Due to there being some missing 
values for some variables (because some of the information held by some companies is 
not publicly available), we are only able to include 268 firm year observations in the final 
fixed effects model. 
- 73-
Table 4.6: I k,cnptlOll and corn:lation matrix for key variables 
MeanlStd.Dev.l I I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 I 10 
1 ,F. Strategic ' , • , . , , , 
change 4,004' 1.067' I· , • , , , 
2.ROA 5.223' 11.95 '-0.19*' I' ! ' ,--- I 
3.Slac.kresource 148.li 173.1 ,1 0.03 'I' -0.14*1 I -t' I i---II.:~ 
~.Envlronmenta I 'I'; 
Dynamic 14.66 97.70 I O.O~ -0.11 10.20* 1 , ___ _ 
5.Firmsize 8.567,1.578,-0.33*,0.23* ,-0.23*, -0.07, I \ .. _ ... 1. 
6.80D size 3.858 1.500' -0.08 0.00 0.03 0.05; 0.25* ~ 1 
~ ·-1 I I 
7.0wnershi~ 54.881 20.93 10.21* -0.10 j 0.01 1 0.00 1-0.17*1-0.38*[ 1 iii 1-..;:;.8.;.;:c~E~o~a..oi-gle-t:.4jj~1 5.796 -0.15* 0.14* .1 ~Q:.Q?J 0.02 nD~~:tQIEt_o._I~~_LU:.::==:J 
9.FF A 0.633, 0.381 10.06*; -0.24* , 0.00; 0.22* • 0.03 ,O.LL 0.01 ,Q.03_. I., 
10. NE 0.931' 0.417 '_0.16*' 0.00 '0.04 i 0.03 '0.10 i 0.01 ' -0.06 ' 0.02 '-0.12*' 1 
II.C2C 0.36810.263 10.15*10.04 1-0.0910.04 10.\3*rO,il[ 0.08 r6:T3*10.()91-0.13* 
Notes: N=268; Slgmfieance level. • p < 0.05 
Table 4.6 reports the means, standard deviations and the pairwise correlation 
matrix of all observed variables in the final FE model. After a CEO succession, the 
strategic change one year forward, which we refer to as strategic change one year forward 
(F.Strategic change), correlated positively and significantly with FF A, C2C, CEO 
ownership, and with some of our control variables. F.strategic change correlated 
negatively and significantly with NE, firm performance (ROA), firm size, and the new 
CEO's age. No serious multicollinearity problem has been detected so far since no 
correlation coefficient of two or more predictors was greater than 0.4. 
Analytical approaches 
Because the data for our focal constructs extend over three years, and we can use 
panel data analysis for the hypothesis testing, a few reasons drove us to select the fixed 
effects method. First, the observations were purposefully selected for this study and were 
not gleaned from a random sampling from a given population (Dougherty, 2007). We ran 
a Hausman test, which produced a significant result, thus indicating the appropriateness of 
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the FE model (Chi-squared test: p-value =.01) (Cameron, 2005). Moreover, an FE model 
lessens our concerns about the autocorrelations and heteroskedasicity of the firm, and 
about the heterogeneities of new CEOs and years as well (Greene, 2003). 
In an FE model, the within-group estimator removes the fixed effects coming both 
from firms and the same new CEOs. It also removes the correlations between independent 
variables and fixed effects. We explain how our independent variables influence the PSSC 
using the following equation: 
Yit is the predicted strategic change, X1t are those independent and control 
variables. The individual effects are both from the firms and from the new CEOs; the 
component (Uiflrm + uinewCBOs ) can only be removed if the observations are gathered 
from the same new CEOs in the same firms over the years. Therefore, the CEO succession 
context provides a unique opportunity to do this. A time-invariant characteristic cannot 
cause strategic changes because it is constant for each new CEO in each firm over the 
years. Given these conditions, we can now make the effects of the psychological states of 
new CEOs, as variables that change over time (time-variant variables) stand out from 
other unobserved and unmeasured factors. 
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Table 4.7: I-I\l'd d'kds models of PSS(' 
F.Strateslc chanle 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 
ROA :Q:O~9"._._ 0.014· 0.019·· O.OlS** 0.011 
.~. ~'"'M •••• ... _ ... -
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] 
.. __ .-
.. - -
:,Iack resource ~.003 0.003 0.002 0.003+ 0.003 •... _ .... _ ... M.M." ... .~ .•.. ' ..-..... -
0.002] 
-.-
O'(~02] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] p.ooo- ~.Ooo --_ .. - -Environmental Dynamic 0.000 p.ooO 0.000 




0.001] 0.001] [0.001] [O.O(U]. [0.001] 
... - --
- -




- -[0.439] 0.442] [0.446] 0.444] 0.440] 
-- - -
BoD size P~12? 
--






O.OSl] [0.OS2] 0.OS2] O.OSl] 
. --- - .. -
~EO ownership p.oo~_ 
--
p.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 
. --- - -[0.004] 0.004] 
... _., .~ ... " 
[0.004] [0.004] 0.004] 
--... ---- ~.254· 0.212+ ---.. -.- p.27S· ~EOage P~19~ __ 0.201+ 
-- .. --
[0.107] [0.109] [0.10S] [0.106] [0.10S] 





- - - - -
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.-. ._.'_ ... '- . 
[0.204] 
._ ... _ .. -
[0.199] 
C2C 
--.- .- ··"H 
_ .. 
p.610· 
... - .. -
0.6.~2· .. 
[0.306] 0.312] 
N 1:.?~. _. ___ ._._._. ~.~~-------.-.-. ~~.---.-.-.--- ~?~-------.---. ~~~.---.-------
N in group 116.000 116.000 116.000 116.000 116.000 
---.-----------. ~:.~~~~:~:~:~:~: ._---- .. _._------ ~;Q~=~~:=:=:=:~: ._._---------_.-sigma u 1.973 1.906 ~~~~~-.-.-.-.-.-_._._._--------- -_ .. _-----_._ .. _--
sigma e p.776 p.764 0.771 0.767 ~~?~~-.-.-.-.-.-
2 w ~~~~:=:=:=:=:=: ~.~:~(:=:=:~:~: O~ii59·-·-·-·-·- O:i~;8-·-·-·-·-- 0.226 
ho p.866 0.S93 ~~~~:~:=:~:=:~ Q;~?~~:=:=:=:~: p~90~·-·-·-·-·-
F ~i~!:=:=:=:=:=: 1:.~!~=:~:=:=:=: ~.856 1.801 ~=~~~:=:=:=:~:-
F f 12.259 2.379 ~~i~7·-·-·-·-·- ~:298-·-·-·-·-· ~.432 
Notes: Standard errors In brackets + p<O.l, • p<0.05, •• p<O.O 1; F tests for all 13=0 and F J tests for all 
u_i=O; results are significant across all models; constants and dummies are not displayed. 
Table 4.7 above reports the results of the FE models that predict PSSC strategic 
variation. We used fixed effects within-group estimators for the calculation. The structure 
was as follows: Model (I) is a baseline model which included only controlled variables 
both of the finns and of the new CEOs. Afterward, we investigated each element in the 
psychosocial trio individually. Models (2), (3) and (4) test the effects of independent 
variables with each of them being entered to the regression individually. Each of these 
three elements illustrates a distinct and significant influence on PSSC. Model (5) is the 
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final model and includes all the control variables and all the independent variables 
together; it demonstrates the overall effects of new CEOs' psychological states on 
strategic changes holistically. The F-tests in all models met the requirements to reject all 
fixed effects coefficients being jointly zero. The fixed effects were significant in all the 
models (numbers in parentheses show the standard errors of the variable coefficients). 
Model (2) tested hypothesis 1; Model (3) tested hypothesis 2; and Model (4) tested 
hypothesis 3. Model (5) provided further supportive evidence for all three hypotheses 
above. The individual and combined influences of all three independent variables on 
strategic changes remained significant in the final model. 
The rho p results show the importance of controlling for the fixed effects generated 
by the same companies and the same new CEOs. Time-invariant variables, including 
gender, ethnic background, elite educational affiliation, industry background, 
insider/outsider difference, previous job experience, among others, are unlikely to be 
changed if the new CEO remains in the post. We therefore believe that by following up 
the same CEOs over the years, a fixed effect approach can help us detect not only the 
fixed effects of the firms, but also the fixed effects generated by the same new CEOs. 
Model (1) is a fixed effects model for firm-level and new CEO-level control 
variables. Apart from our focal constructs, hislher psychological states, the individual 
effects rho p makes up 86.5% of the variance in strategic changes in the baseline model, 
and p = 90.8% of the variance in the final model (5). It made the effects of the 
psychological state of new CEOs clearer after considering both firm and new CEO fixed 
effects in the models. 
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For all of the models, the assumption that all unobserved finns' and new CEOs' 
characteristics would be equal was rejected (F-tests that all u_i = 0); it indicates the 
obvious existence of fixed effects in all models. Because most of the variance in strategic 
change is explained by differences between finns and between new CEOs' characteristics 
rather than changes in the psychological states of new CEOs over time, failure to consider 
firm and new-CEO fixed effects would result in biased estimations of the effects of new 
CEOs' psychological states on strategic changes. 
The results support hypothesis I that states "new CEOs' future-focused attention 
will influence the post-succession strategic change; an increase in FF A will increase the 
degree of strategic changes". As shown in both Model (2) and Model (5), new CEOs' FFA 
will increase strategic changes (un standardized estimated fixed effect coefficients P = 
0.417* and 0.477*); compared to the baseline Model (1) which included the controlled 
variables only, the addition of new CEOs' future focus in Model (2) improved the R2_W 
for the strategic changes by 2.2%. Moreover, the fixed effects coefficients of new CEOs' 
FF A were both positive and significant, irrespective of whether they were examined 
individually, in Model (2). or considered together with other psychological elements 
holistically. in the final model (5). 
The results support hypothesis 2 that states "negative emotions of new CEOs will 
negatively associate with the degree of PSSC: an increase in NE level will decrease the 
PSSC. and a decrease in NE level will increase the PSSC". As shown in Model (3) and 
Model (5). the increase in new CEOs' NE will decrease strategic changes (P = -0.433* in 
Model (3), and P = -0.399* in Model (5». Compared to the baseline Model (1), the 
addition of the new CEOs' negative emotion in Model (3) increased .,1R2 _W by 2.7%. 
Moreover, the fixed effects coefficients of new CEOs' negative emotions were both 
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negative and significant, irrespective of whether they were examined individually, in 
Model (2), or examined together with other psychological elements holistically, in the 
final model (5). 
The results provided further supportive evidence for hypothesis 3 that states "an 
increase in a new CEO's commitment to change will generate a greater degree of post-
succession strategic change". We expect that an increase in a new CEO's level of C2C 
will result in a greater PSSc. As shown in Models (4) and (5), increases in new CEOs' 
C2C increased strategic changes (p = 0.610* in Model (4) and p = 0.632* in Model (5)). 
Moreover, the addition of a further variable describing new CEOs' C2C in Model (4) 
increased LlR2 _w by 1.6 % compared to the baseline Model (1). Moreover, the fixed 
effects coefficients of new CEOs' C2C were both positive and significant irrespective of 
whether they were examined individually, in Model (2), or considered it together with 
other psychological elements holistically, in the final model (5). 
When we included all three elements in the final model (5), all the effects of the 
above independent variables on PSSC remained significant in the same directions. In fact, 
the R_w2 obtained with the fmal model (5) was 22.6%, much greater than that obtained 
when they were only considered singly in Models (2), (3) and (4) (whose LlR2 _w values 
were 6.2%, 5.7% and 6.8%, respectively) .. We believe that this final model was much 
better at explaining the PSSC when considering the three distinctive elements of a new 
CEO's psychologic~l1 state. It meets our original expectation that apart from emphasizing 
cognition, adding emotion and conation of the new CEO minds into the consideration will 
better explain the PSSC. 
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Interestingly, we also identified some additive interaction effects of these three 
distinct psychological factors from the analysis. A natural way to access interactions is to 
measure the extent to which the effect of the all the factors together exceeds the effect of 
each factor considered individually compared to the baseline (VanderWeele and Knol, 
2012). The R_w2 of Model (I) baseline is .142; (2) FFA is .164; (3) NE is .169; (4) C2C 
is .158; and (5) full is .226. The difference of R_w2 between the final full models and 
three main effects individually is .019.19 Thus, it discloses a potential positive interaction 
among these three factors. 
Some of the control variables did not show significant effects on PSSC in any of 
the models, specifically the level of industrial dynamic, Board of Directors size, and the 
new CEO ownership ratio. We did, however, find some interesting patterns for certain 
control variables. For example, size of firm had significant negative correlations with 
strategic change, thus a good example of organizational inertia (Shimizu and Hitt, 2005). 
We could also see that the effects of the new CEOs' age, which was one of the proxies for 
the new CEOs' power, had a certain significant and positive impact on strategic change 
across the models. 
As the hypothesis proposes, a firm's performance (ROA) has a negative impact on 
its strategic change in the future: when the performance of a firm increases, strategic 
changes will be reduced. ROA had negative and significant coefficients in all but the final 
model (5). When we took into account all three psychosocial elements simultaneously, the 
effects of prior performance disappeared. It is possible that the effects of ROA on strategic 
change were masked or evened out as a result of more psychological factors having been 
19 the difference of R_w 2 = (.226 - .142) - ((.164 - .142) + (.169 - .142) + (.158 - .142) ) = .019 
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involved. These integrated elements from the new CEOs' psychological trio playa 
possible mediating role which might eliminate the direct effects of ROA on PSSC. 
Ultimately, the external signals such as ROA and other performance indicators need to be 
perceived, to be interpreted by the new CEOs, the commanders of strategic changes. 
4.6. Discussions & conclusions 
4.6.1. Theoretical implications 
According to previous studies and theoretical arguments, external causes are 
expected to have significant influences on PSSC. Many researchers (Kaplan, 2011, Kaplan, 
2008, Eggers and Kaplan, 2009, SE~ and Barrett, 2007, Cho and Hambrick, 2006, 
McClelland, 20 I 0, Baron, 2008, Krueger et at, 2000) look at top executives internally and 
assert that some elements, even a single psychological factor of leaders, can influence the 
strategies of their companies. I argue, however, that these claims are likely be incomplete 
on account of ignoring other important components in the human psychological trio. Only 
emphasizing the cognition of new CEOs will miss the bigger picture; investigating their 
psychological trilogy helps us understand the mechanism better behind PSSC (LlR 2 _w is 
6.2% between Model (2) and Model (5); the p-value in F test results for model fitness of 
Model (5) also became even more significant). Furthermore, this research provides some 
empirical evidence about the positive additive interaction among these three psychological 
factors. It contributes to our understanding of the trilogy-of-mind theory «Hilgard, 1980) 
which overemphasizes the main effects of the human psychological factors. 
4.6.2. Methodological implications 
In the case of non-experimental field studies, statistical problems arising from, for 
example, cross-sectional design, unobserved heterogeneity, common method single source 
bias, and omitted variable bias will produce many misleading results. In studying the 
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changes that follow CEO succession, following the same new CEOs over a period of time 
gave us a unique opportunity to remove both time-invariant characteristics of the new 
CEOs and firm-level individual effects from the analysis/model. So far, few studies in the 
prior literature have successfully developed such an approach. 
This study makes some useful enhancements by using a panel data analysis of 
psychological states and tracing the same new CEOs after succession in a non-experiment 
field study. Unmeasured differences both in the attributes of the firms and in the new 
CEOs will influence the degree of strategic changes. In a CEO succession context, panel 
data can be used to overcome not only the methodological problems generated by 
unobserved heterogeneity about the characteristics of the firms, but also the unobserved 
heterogeneity about those time-invariant new CEO characteristics. Using exponential 
smoothing technique can help us better gauge the changes, depending on historical trend 
and the actual factors. Strategic changes have been better measured using this method 
rather than using the moving to average approach that many researchers adopted. 
4.6.3. l.imitations of this study and future work 
As we know, a long T (times of the observations) in panel data can help us to 
achieve better results. However, long T data are very difficult to obtain. Therefore, we 
need to select an appropriate timeframe for the observations. We need to make some 
tradeoffs to reach the balance between data availability and mathematical fineness. For 
future studies, we might be able to narrow down the unit of time~ we can collect quarterly 
data rather than annual data about CEOs from company internal materials such as minutes 
of meetings, CEOs' speeches, conference calls, information from press releases and the 
media. By so doing, we can detect the nuances of the new CEOs' psychological changes 
and the strategic changes using different lenses. Comparing figures through the lenses of 
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metaphorical telescopes and microscopes will be very interesting. This study provides 
evidence that explains the importance of intra-individual (time-varying) psychological 
differences in the PSSC mechanism. Another potential interesting direction is to 
investigate the possible mediation roles of new CEOs' psychology in strategic 
management using other longitudinal analytic approaches. Due to the external validity 
challenges, the results and findings in our studies might not be apply in other geographic 
territories, for example, the Far East and the Middle East. Further studies in different 
countries will be necessary to improve the generalization of our findings. 
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Chapter 5. Essay Three: The degree of analysis (DoA) of new CEOs' 
cognitive reasoning and firms' cash holding 
ABSTRACT: 
Based on the cognitive continuum theory (CCT), this research advocates that new CEOs' 
cognitive reasoning and provides new explanations for the mechanism behind the cash 
holding phenomenon. It is down to CEOs to appreciate the needs and the associated risks. 
This study examines the relationship between the degree of analysis (DoA) in new CEOs' 
cognitive continuum and the cash holding policies; it suggests that DoA will increase 
firms' cash holding level because DoA tends to raise the calculated transaction costs, the 
management controls, the uncertainty avoidance behaviors and the opportunity costs. 
Using a psycholinguistic approach and computer-aided text analysis (CAT A) technique, 
the empirical results of this longitudinal study support these claims for non-financial and 
non-utility firms in the FTSE All-Share Index. 
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5.1. Introduction 
"Cash is king" is an age-old saying that stresses the importance of cash for the 
overall fiscal health of an organization. Companies are holding ever more cash than they 
used to, and cash holding is becoming a popular tendency. For example, Bates et al. (2009) 
found that the average cash to assets ratio of US firms increased from 10.5% in 1980 to 
23.2% in 2006. In Europe 2012, the 1,000 biggest non-fmancial firms held over $1.36 
trillion in cash and cash equivalents (Patnaude, 2013). Cash hoarding is a notorious 
phenomenon among western companies (Jackson, 2013); these cash-rich firms could not 
contribute to the economic recovery because they were unwilling to spend money; they 
will eventually put themselves in the position of competitive disadvantage because of the 
lack ~fproduct innovation, manufacturing efficiency and technology (Gara, 2012). 
To find a proper level of cash holding will be of interest to shareholders who 
always look at their pockets. Executives who are worried about cash act quickly to close 
factories and stores, layoff employees, postpone capital spending, and to abort research 
and development (R&D). As such, cash holding has crucial implications for other strategic 
issues. It is very important for a CEO to judge the optimal level of the cash holding of 
his/her firm and adjust it accordingly. Without enough cash on hand, companies can run 
into major trouble, and even be forced into bankruptcy. However, carrying excess cash 
could reduce shareholders' wealth because cash is not immediately invested in operations; 
it cannot earn returns to meet the firm's capital costs (Jensen et aI., 1999). It is all about 
the tradeoff and the right balance. 
The widely accepted assumption is that the main factor behind cash holding is 
economic uncertainty. Hence, scholars look for external factors such as environmental 
instability and pressure from shareholders to explain the phenomenon. However, the ways 
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in which infonnation is processed are vital for making good decisions (Hwang and Lin, 
1999). It depends on how the leaders as the decision-makers appreciate the need for and 
risks attached to a given cash level. 
We intend to contribute to the behavioral finance literature by taking into account 
the decision-makers' cognitive reasoning. This research discusses a promising remedy for 
cash hoarding, by suggesting that CEOs should reduce the degree of analysis (DoA) in 
their cognitive reasoning and think more intuitively. 
Leadership succession is a risky process (Giambatista et aI., 2005, Rowe and 
Cannella, 2005). Under this uncertain circumstance with many challenges, it will be 
particularly interesting to know how new CEOs manage finns' cash holding levels. We 
attempt to use the cognitive continuum theory (CCT) (Hammond, 1996; Doherty and Kurz, 
1996) to investigate whether or not and how the dynamic of DoA throughout CEOs' 
tenure influence their firms' corporate cash level. 
5.2. Theoretical Background: the cash holding motives 
Holding cash comes with a certain amount of cost. The concerns of the balance 
between the costs and benefits of cash holding are the foundations of the tradeoff theory 
(Opler et aI., 1999). Generally speaking, there are three motives that create the tradeoffs, 
i.e. transaction cost motives (saving transaction costs to raise funds), precautionary 
motives (preparing for future uncertainty) and agency motives (managers' self-interests 
preferences to reduce their own risks). 
5.2.1. Transaction motives 
External finances are all subject to considerable transaction costs such as 
marketing campaigns, brokerage costs, and underwriting fees (Baumol, 1952, Miller and 
Orr, 1966). Therefore, finns prefer holding onto a certain amount of cash to cover the 
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costs of cash shortages. Moreover, the higher these transaction costs are, the greater will 
be the amount of cash firms will hold onto. Empirical studies show that the transaction 
costs for bigger companies to raise cash are lower; bigger economies of scale and less 
information asymmetry help them to keep a relatively smaller cash reserve than smaller 
firms (Mulligan, 1997). 
5.2.2. Pret'a 1I tiollary Illotives 
Another reason for cash holdings is the precautionary motive. Unlike transaction 
motives, in which "transactions have to be foreseen and occur in a steady stream" 
(Baumol, 1952), p.545), precautionary motives emphasize the potential impacts arising 
from the sudden potential investment opportunities and risks. However, most empirical 
studies did not investigate precautionary motives directly, but instead looked at some 
proxies, including increased financial constraints (Opler et at., 1999), increased cash flow 
volatility (Almeida et at., 2005, Han and Qiu, 2007), and increased growth potentials 
(Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009). 
5.2.3. Agency motives 
CEOs and shareholders evaluate the pros and cons of cash holding differently 
because of their conflicting interests and standpoints. CEOs have more incentive to hold 
onto cash because it could reduce their own risks and gain them more control over their 
firms. Jensen (1986) produced a free cash flow theory to explain the motivations of 
managers (that is, CEOs) to hold onto cash for their personal compensation, benefit, and 
goals. A further reason that CEOs prefer to rely on internal funds is to avoid being 
monitored. Large free cash flows increase CEOs' power, but with large amounts of cash 
on hand, they could be tempted to make blind investments, and quite often bad ones which 
will damage the wealth of shareholders (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009). 
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Apart from above three tradeoff factors, we also have to consider the CEO's 
cognitive mind. The decision-makers are typical, bounded rational people (Pompian, 2012) 
whose various reasoning strategies can result in biased judgments and decisions for their 
companies. It is down to the CEOs to calculate and appraise the transaction costs of 
raising finance; CEOs depend on their thinking patterns to perceive future uncertainty, 
corporate governance and act upon their perception (Rindova, 1999). We suggest that 
CEOs' intuition and analysis are other important sources oftradeoffs for the cash holding. 
5.3. Hypothesis development 
The sections below will discuss: 1) the importance ofCEOs' cognition for the cash 
holding policies; 2) the notion of analysis and intuition; 3) the cognitive continuum theory 
and quasi-rationality; 4) a hypothesized relationship between new CEOs' DoA and cash 
holding. 
5.3.1. CEOs and their cognition for firms' financial decisions and cash holding 
policies 
Why do CEOs, and not others matter to the important financial decisions? 
Malmendier et al. (2011) found that CEOs directly determine financing strategies for their 
firms, and that even when Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) help to determine them, their 
decisions positively correlate with the CEOs' traits. Graham et al. (2011) have shown that 
CFOs mainly execute orders and implement strategies set by CEOs. Furthermore, CEOs 
can tum down or approve a stock offering at the last moment, or overrule their CFOs. 
Hence, CEOs will almost certainly have the ultimate say. It is therefore valid and 
reasonable to focus on the effects of CEOs' thoughts on firms' cash holding policies. For 
instance, Franck Riboud, CEO of Danone, set the target to an increase of 10% in cash 
holdings in 2010 (Danone Annual Report, 2009). Jouko Karvinen, CEO of Stora Enso, 
attributed his company's success in dealing with the 2008 financial crisis to a strategic 
- 88-
focus on cash holding in the previous years (Lehtinen, 2011). Karvinen and his top 
management team had effectively managed the working capital to reduce expenditure and 
minimize operational costs. Norbert Reithofer, CEO of BMW, commented that due to the 
uncertain conditions on international capital markets, they increased their cash levels at 
the beginning of 2009 (BMW Annual Report, 2009). Reithofer clearly expressed his 
precautionary motivations in taking cash as a useful tool for dealing with the upcoming 
difficulties. To make sure their firms have enough but not excessive money for future 
investments, cash holding is a primary decision for the CEOs (Lins et aI., 2010), 
(Campello et aI., 20 I 0). 
For the purposes of examining cash holding policy, previous studies have mainly 
focused on the level of CEO ownership, the effects of descendant and founder CEOs, and 
the differences between insider and outsider CEOs (Faulkender, 2002, Niskanen and 
Steijvers, 2011, Steijvers and Niskanen, 2012). However, the need for cash has to be 
evaluated and decided by CEOs. In the CEO succession period, the new CEOs can 
exercise a high level of discretion (Orens and Reheul, 2013) and, therefore, they will have 
a substantial influence on their firms' cash holding policies. 
5.3.2. Reasoning 
5.3.2. J. Cognitive reasoning 
Reasoning is the ''workshop'' of one's mind, and it works as the "control panel" for 
signals from the interior which provide the potential guidance for judgment and decision-
making (Hodgkinson et aI., 2009). An individual's ability to reason things through is vital 
because it governs the rest of his or her qualities (Woiceshyn, 2009), for example, the 
individual's ability to speak and to design something, or to manage a business. Generally 
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speaking, there are two types of reasoning, namely, analytic/rational reasoning and 
intuitive/experiential reasoning (Taggart and Valenzi, 1990), (Epstein et aI., 1996). 
Kahneman defined intuitive reasoning as thoughts and preferences that come to 
mind quickly and with little reflection «Kahneman, 2002), p.449). Analytical reasoning is 
a "step by step, conscious, logically defensible process" (Hammond, 1996), p.60). 
Intuition and analysis are fundamental bridging constructs in behavioral science 
(Hodgkinson et aI., 2008). The single superordinate dimension of cognition that underpins 
numerous facets of information processing is the intuition-analysis continuum, i.e. the 
magnitude of DoA 
(Allinson et aI., 2000, Dhami and Thomson, 20l3). For this research, we will take 
on this dimension; we define cognitive reasoning as the general judgment guidance with 
different DoA (from low to high) that managers adopt for company decision-making. 
5.3.2.2. Intuition VS AnalysiS: Which one is better? 
Analysis and intuition will influence the decision outcomes, including their 
consistency, error distribution, response rate, self-insight to policy, confidence level 
(Dunwoody et aI., 2000), decision disturbances (Elbanna et aI., 2013) and organizational 
performance (Khatri and Ng, 2000). 
An improvement in judgment does not necessarily demand a greater use of 
analysis (using all relevant and available information), but rather requires the appropriate 
use of the most predictively valid pieces of information (Gigerenzer et aI., 1999); actually, 
the way in which information is processed is vital for making good decisions (Hwang and 
Lin, (1999). Analysis increases the comprehensiveness of a strategic decision. However, 
this comprehensiveness does not necessarily increase the quality of the decision. For 
example, Souitaris and Maestro (2010) found that the comprehensiveness of decisions 
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hanns the perfonnance of high-tech finns. Comprehensiveness only has a positive effect 
on the quality of a decision when the quantity and detenninacy of infonnation are both 
high (Miller, 2008, Dhami and Thomson, 2013). Thus, for the new CEOs facing 
uncertainty, being completely rational and relying on analysis may not produce the best 
cash holding decision. 
5.3.3. Dichotomy vs. continuum. 
Researchers mainly adopt either a dichotomy or a continuum VIew to study 
analysis and intuition. Dual process theories suggest that there are two separate cognitive 
systems (Chaiken and Trope, 1999, Epstein, 2003, Sloman, 1996, Gilovich et aI., 2002). 
System 1 is an automatic, associative, holistic, and fast-working process that requires little 
cognitive effort and which is acquired through evolution, development and experience. 
System 2 is a slow, control, rule-based, and analytical process learned through formal 
training. Most dual process theories adopt an either-or (conflicted) approach. Some 
researchers argue that there is a switch mechanism in managers' brains whereby one mode 
of cognition takes precedence over the other (Huang and Souitaris, 2009), and that people 
are free to switch between two parallel systems. However, neither analysis nor intuition 
can be easily employed (Hammond, 1996). Pure analysis can only be employed by those 
trained in it. 
Cognitive continuum theory (Doherty and Kurz, 1996, Hammond, 1996) provides 
an alternative view by recognizing modes of cognition that lie between analysis and the 
intuition continuum. Dhami and Thomson (2013) advocate that a quasi-rationality is an 
important explanatory variable in understanding how managers make up their minds and 
make decisions. 20 A quasi-rationality is cognitive reasoning with an appropriate DoA 
20 For a detailed summarized description of eCT and its inherent properties, please refer to Appendix 2. 
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which helps managers achieve a good enough decision with low analytic costs (Simon, 
1987). 
There are many uncertainties, time pressures, risks, as well as resource scarcity and 
anxiety for the new CEOs. On the one hand, the new CEOs need to be able to analyze 
problems systematically; on the other hand, he/she also needs to be able to respond to 
situations rapidly. Therefore, quasi-rationality with a proper DoA is very useful. CEO 
succession provides us a unique opportunity to study firms' strategies under the 
administration of the same CEOs longitudinally. We propose that the dynamic DoA 
during CEOs' tenure generates the variants of firms' cash holding policies. 
5.3.4. Hypothesized relationships: Cognitive reasoning in financial decisions 
Financial decision-making has been typically deemed as an analytical and rationale 
driven topic (Tronnberg and Hemlin, 2013). However, more and more researchers have 
identified the important role of intuition in financial decision-making (Hensman and 
Sadler-Smith, 2011). For example, some credit decision interviews (Lipshitz and 
Shulimovitz, 2007) found when rating the credibility of loan applicants, loan officers 
integrated "hard" financial data with "soft" data such as impressions and gut feelings; they 
treated feelings as more valid indicators of applicants' credit worthiness than financial 
figures (they are more keen to use impression information and give more credit to it). 
They even claimed that relying on intuition with a low DoA in cognitive reasoning may 
lead to better evaluation results and get more creditworthiness than deliberation decisions. 
Information such as impressions, relationships with clients as well as other 
information not found in the financial records cannot be quantified easily (Boot, 2000). In 
this research, we propose that the DoA will influence cash holding due to the mechanism 
in the following arguments. 
- 92-
5.3.4.1. DoA and the calculation of transaction costs 
The DoA is associated with the amount of cognitive effort and intention involved 
in reasoning (Hogarth, 2001, Hogarth, 2010, Epstein et aI., 1996, Myers, 2004). These 
differences in intentional cognitive effort will lead to the variant in estimated results. 
A high amount of cognitive effort increases people's cognitive complexity and 
they will use multiple perspectives when they perceive and evaluate stimuli (Goodwin and 
Ziegler, 1998). A high DoA will favor the use of numerical and verbal data compared to 
a low DoA which has a preference for qualitative and vivid pictorial data (Dunwoody et 
aI., 2000, Doherty and Kurz, 1996, Dhami and Thomson, 2013). Therefore, with a high 
DoA, CEOs tend to use numerical and quantitative methods to calculate the transaction 
costs of raising funds; they will involve a more complex encoding in their memory 
systems (Hammond, 1996). By considering more factors into the thinking processes, the 
DoA will increase CEOs' evaluation complexity and expected cash holding level. 
With a high DoA, new CEOs will try hard to gain information and knowledge 
about the organizations and environments in which the firms operate (Richard et aI., 2009). 
These will explicitly and implicitly raise the estimated transaction costs of getting funds 
and will make firms retain more cash on hand. 
5.3.4.2. DoA and management control 
A high DoA will lead to a high level of conscious control and a slow speed of 
processing because infonnation sources are consciously integrated into a judgment via a 
specific policy (Dunwoody et aI., 2000). Analysis supports the planning and control 
processes (Herath, 2007). Control is a very important management function guiding the 
attainment of a preconceived goal or objective. A very important property of analysis is 
the need for confidence in judgment (Doherty and Kurz, 1996, Epstein et aI., 1996). 
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Boosting their confidence level, new CEOs implement control over their finns VIa 
increasing their finns' cash holding level. 
A high DoA will use consistent infonnation rules. It will use the same infonnation 
categories and policies in the same way with each judgment. Therefore, the reliability of 
decision and decision consistency are high (Dunwoody et aI., 2000, Doherty and Kurz, 
1996, Hammond, 1988, Hammond, 1996). These feelings of decision reliability will 
enhance decision-makers' confidence and feeling of control. The psychology literature 
suggests that executives are particularly prone to exhibit self-attribution and illusions of 
control (Malmendier et aI., 2011). Huang et al. (2011) found that CEOs who want stronger 
control over their finns will hold more cash than others. They may reserve cash for 
activities such as buying back shares and hunting for large investment opportunities 
(Huang et aI., 2011). Therefore, we believe that the DoA in CEOs' cognitive continuum 
will increase finns' cash holding level. 
5.3.4.3. DuA and lIncertainty avoidance 
The cash holding of a finn is positively correlated with the degree of uncertainty 
avoidance (Ramirez and Tadesse, 2007). Those uncertainty avoidance companies will 
hold more cash (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009), (Chen et aI., 2013). Malmendier et al. 
«Malmendier et aI., 2011) found that CEOs' early-life experiences, for example, growing 
up during the Great Depression and graduating during a recession will make them more 
averse towards uncertainty. Uncertainty avoidance is one of the key reasons for holding 
cash, even for those financially unconstrained companies (Dittmar and Duchin, 2013); for 
example, CEOs' previous employment experience in financially difficult finns will make 
their cash to assets ratio 3.1-4.4% higher. 
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A high DoA is associated with uncertainty avoidance because the information is 
processed under consistent procedures and guidelines (Hammond, 1996, Dunwoody et aI., 
2000, Doherty and Kurz, 1996). In contrast, a low DoA will reduce people's perception of 
risk and increase their risk taking behavior (Bohm and Brun, 2008). Therefore we expect 
that the high DoA will increase fIrms' cash holding level. 
New CEOs with a high DoA will think hard and have longer time perspectives. In 
contrast, with a low DoA, CEOs are less likely to do explicit planning and prefer to make 
last minute decisions. Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009) found that the long-term orientation 
will value the commitment of social and business relationships, which encourages 
patience, thrift and self-reliance. We expect that a high DoA will make CEOs more alert. 
For those companies which tend to offer long-term job security to employees (Newman 
and Nollen, 1996), CEOs will maintain larger balances of cash to support it. 
With a high DoA, CEOs will have broader coverage of the topic and be more 
prudent (Bartunek et aI., 1983). We expect that with a high DoA, CEOs attach more value 
to the precautionary and flexible role of cash and grant less value to the opportunity costs 
of cash. Firms run by conservative CEOs are more likely to be cash-rich (Dittmar and 
Duchin, 2012). The higher the DoA, the more risk averse and conservative the CEOs will 
be (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Risk-averse CEOs prefer internal funding over external 
funding. A high DoA will make CEOs hold a high level of cash to hedge against future, 
undesirable events. 
5.3.4.4. (Low) DoA, know/edge and opportunity costs.' 
According to Epstein (2003), intuition, a low level of DoA, is associated with 
experience and knowledge, or a combination of both based on previous similar situations 
(Hensman and Sadler-Smith, 2011, Epstein et aI., 1996). By looking at the fIrst year after 
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turnover, Custodio and Metzger (2012) found that new CEOs with financial experiences 
decrease their cash levels; they have a higher propensity to pay dividends and repurchase 
shares. Financial experts have better access to capital markets (Guner et aI., 2008). 
Sophisticated CEOs manage financial policies more actively, communicating better with 
financial markets; therefore, we can assume that with a low DoA, intuition will bring 
down the cash holding needs oftheir firms. 
A low DoA is associated with high speed information processing and low 
cognitive burden (Doherty and Kurz, 1996, Dhami and Thomson, 2013). Faster 
information processing and a shorter response time will bring competitive advantages to 
the firms; a quick decision also reduces the opportunity cost of time. Moreover, a low 
DoA, i.e. effortless intuition, will also reduce the calculation costs (Forbes, 2007) of cash 
holding decisions. In all, a low DoA will reduce firms' cash holding. 
To sum up, the DoA will influence the calculation patterns, increase the 
evaluation complexity and estimated transaction costs. A high DoA is correlated with 
uncertainty avoidance activities. A high DoA is more likely to generate the need for 
confidence in judgment and enhance CEOs' cash holding decisions to archive stronger 
management control. On the other hand, intuition, namely, a low DoA, is not just a 
"guess"; it is correlated with new CEOs' knowledge and experience which will bring 
down their firms' need for cash holding. An effortless low DoA also reduces the costs of 
the calculation involved, the response time, and the associated opportunity costs. Based on 
these arguments, a hypothesized relationship is developed as below: 
Hypothesis: the DoA of new CEO cognitive reasoning will irifluence their firms' 
cash holding level. A high DoA will increase the firms' cash holding level; in contrast, a 
low DoA will decrease the cash holding level of the firms. 
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S.4. Research methods and measurements 
To catch the dynamic of DoA during CEOs' tenure and develop stronger causal 
relationships, we adopted a longitudinal research design and collected panel data from the 
field. We selected the companies from the FTSE All-Share Index21 based on the criteria 
below: 1) the CEO succession took place from 2002 to 2007; 2) non-financial and non-
utility industrial firms only; 3) BoDs and CEOs' information were available; and 4) CEOs' 
shareholder letters were available in the next 3 continuous years after the succession. 
Because of the data availability of some key variables, the fmal dynamic model contains 
382 observations. Within these observations, the average number of words in these CEO 
shareholder letters is 1956. 
21 The top 600s companies in the FTSE (Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange). 
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Tablp 5.8: Summary of Constructs, Variables, Measurements Theoretical Assumptions and Data Sources 
~onstructs Variables pperadonalizadon/Measurement :Theories & expected :Sources 
~ reladonshlps 
~. Dependent variables: Cash holding level 
:Cashl ;Cash and equivalents/total assets Bloomberg 
: :'TIB/DataSt 
'Cash2 (for :Cash and equivalents/( total assets - ~ team 
'robustness checks) 'cash and eauivalents) : 
~. Control variables: Important factors found In prior empirical studies 
[Environmental Environmental The rate of sales change for each :rransaetion theory (+) TIB 
haracteristics Dynamism industry each year :rreeautionary theory( +) Bloomberg 
~Time effects year dummies . 
F·i-~-~h~;.a~i~ristic-sfi~;;; ;iZe- .. -.--.. . ·---)'n (n-umber o[cmpToyec0----- frmnsactlon-theory<:y-----------1fi-s----------
firm growth trend frhe change rate of annual sales for 
rreeautionary theory (-) :Bloomberg 
raeh firm trransaction thcory( -) 
(:ash.llow 
:rrecautionary theory( +) 
klncomeBefExtraltemsAndPfdDiv trransaction theory( +) 
~ :precautionary theory( -) 
Quick ratio 
pepreeiationDeplAmortExpcnse )Ito ~ 
;tal assets :rransaction theory (+) 
'I'rccautionary theory (-) 
~Current assets - inventory) leurrent ~ 
':Leverage ~iabilities trransaetion theory (-) 
rr otal debt / total assets rreeautionary theory ( -) 
pebt maturity ffransaction theory (+) 
?t"eeautionary theory (+) 
',STDebtAndCurPortLTDebt Itotal 
':Dividend ratio 'debt trransaction theory ( -) 
jPrecautionary theory (-) 
Fapi,al intensity fommon Dividends/ total assets 1ransaction theory (+) 
:Precautionary theory (+) 
ITotal assets/sales 
-.------.------.-------------~- ... ---.- .. --- ... -.---.... --.--------------------~----------------------------------------------+--------------~ EO ownership :The pereentage of new CEOs' ;Agent theory (-) ~oardex 
Irorporate ; :equity ownership occupied in the ; 'Bloomberg 
~ovemance jwhole BoDs 
tAgent theory (-) 
'Board size :Number of directors 
13· explanatory variables: focal constructs (need to be tested In the CEO succession context) 
trhc degree of pOA 1W0rds related to cognition terms in ~ognitive continuum theory ~EO 
~nalysis in CEOs' Is text. (the Diction 5.0 score) +) hareholder 
1C0gnitive etters 
reasoning 
Notes: we categorize vartables Into three groups: the dependent variables, control variables and the 
explantory variable. (-) represents an expected negative relationship and (+) represents an expected 
positive relationship between cash holding level and other variables from different theoretical 
perspectives. 
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Table 5.8. summarizes the constructs/variables that we plan to use for the hypotheses 
testing. It illustrates the operationalization of the measurements, theoretical assumptions, 
expected relationships and data sources. 
5.4.1. Dependent variable 
Cash holding level: We use the two most popular measures: (1) CASHI is the 
cash and equivalents in a specific year divided by the book value of total assets (Ozkan 
and Ozkan, 2004), (Levitas and McFadyen, 2009); (2) for the robustness checks, CASH2 
is the ratio of cash and equivalents (i.e. cash and short term investments) to total assets 
less cash and marketable securities (Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2008, Opler et aI., 
1999). 
5.4.2. Control variables 
Based on the three most important motives, i.e. transaction cost, precautionary and 
agency motives, we summarized important explanatory variables at three different levels. 
5.4.2.1. Environmental and external impacts 
Environmental dynamic: We expect that environmental uncertainty will create 
information asymmetry which hampers firms in raising funding externally (Baum et aI., 
2006). Hence, it increases the level of corporate cash holding. We use the rate of sales 
change for each industry each year as a proxy for it. 
Year dummies: We also expect that cash holding policies will influenced by 
specific environmental factors in different years. 
5.4.2.2. Firms' characteristics 
Firm size: Transaction cost researchers believe that bigger sized firms can more 
easily liquidate their assets (Bates et aI., 2009). Economies of scale help firms (Mulligan, 
1997), (Barclay and Smith, 1995) to reduce the costs of raising money. From a 
precautionary point of view (Rajan and Zingales, 1995), information about large firms will 
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be better available in the public domain which helps external fund providers make 
decisions easily. Less information asymmetry (Jordan et aI., 1998), (Berger et aI., 2001) 
and financial constraints (Whited, 1992) will make big firms less likely to suffer financial 
distress from cash shortages (Titman and Wessels, 1988) than small firms. Hence, we 
expect a negative relation between firm size and cash holding. The logarithm of employee 
number will be used to represent the size of the firms. 
Growth opportunities: Growth opportunities are important reasons for firms to 
hold cash , (Opler et aI., 1999), (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004, Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). 
Managers do not want to be monitored externally by debt holders (Garcia-Ternel and 
Martinez-Solano, 2008). Hence, we expect a negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and cash holding. We use a way adopted by Garcia-Ternel and Martinez-
Solano (2008) taking one year turnover change rate of the firm as a proxy for the growth 
potential. 
Cash flow ratio (the ratio of cash flows to total assets): A large cash flow will 
keep firms at a high cash holding level (Opler et aI., 1999, Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). 
However, Kim et al. (1998) claim a negative relationship. because cash flow is an 
additional source of substitute cash to fill the cash need. The relationships between cash 
flow ratio and cash holding are unclear from different literature and need attention in our 
research context. We use the ratio of cash flows to total assets representing the firms' cash 
flow generation capability. 
Quick ratio: Quick ratio is an accounting measure commonly used to evaluate 
corporate financial health (Stickney and Brown, 1999). An ideal quick ratio is 1 or above 
and finns do not face immediate pressure of financial constraints. A high ratio shows the 
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viability of a finn (Laitinen, 1992) to meet its obligations. A healthy finn can generate 
cash return; therefore, we expect a positive relationship between quick ratio and cash level. 
Leverage: In some empirical studies (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004), (Opler et aI., 1999, 
Ferreira and Vilela, 2004), researchers have found that leverage (debt to assets ratio) 
decreases the cash holding because the cost of funds used to invest in liquid assets rises as 
financial leverage increases (Baskin, 1987). John (1993) stressed that the ability to access 
the debt markets can resort to borrowing as a substitute for liquids assets. Thus, we expect 
a negative relationship between leverage and cash holding level. 
Debt maturity structure: With a big proportion of short-tenn debt, firms have to 
negotiate the renewal of their credits periodically with high refinancing risks (Guney et aI., 
2007), (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) advocate 
finns having a bigger proportion of short-term debt will keep high cash levels to avoid the 
financial distress and pay off their debt on time. 
Dividend ratio: Bates et a1. (2009) found that firms currently paying dividends are 
able to raise funds at a lower cost by reducing their dividend payments. From a 
precautionary point of view, dividend ratio is a positive signal to the public that firms can 
access to the capital market better. Thus, we assume a negative relationship between 
dividend ratio and cash holding level. 
Capital intensity ratio: This ratio reflects a company's efficiency to manage its 
assets contributing to the revenue generated. The higher this ratio, the bigger the 
investment required to generate sales. We expect that capital intensity is positively related 
to cash holding because capital intensive firms need to hold more cash for the investment 
purposes. We use total assets to sales ratio for this measure. 
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5.4.23. Corporate ,qovemallce factors 
CEO ownership: Interest conflicts between shareholders and managers are less 
likely to occur when managers own more company shares (Chen and Chuang, 2009, 
Faulkender, 2002). However, from an entrenchment view, greater ownership gives CEOs 
more direct controls over the firms to resist outside pressures (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) 
and hold more cash to pursues their own interests. The relationships between CEO 
ownership and cash holding are controversial in the field and need to be examined in our 
context. Here, we use the proportion CEO's equity share in the total equity share owned 
by the whole BoDs. 
Board size: We suppose that board size will increase the monitor on CEOs' power; 
it will reduce the chances of CEOs' opportunism (Faulkender, 2002, Faulkender and 
Wang, 2006). Therefore, the number of board members will be negatively related to cash 
holding level. 
As discussed above, these variables meet the Bono and McNamara (2011) criteria 
of the proper inclusion of control variables. They are expected to correlate with the 
independent and dependent variables owing to strong theoretical foundations, i.e. 
transaction costs, and precaution and agency motives. 
S.4.3. Explanatory variable 
CEO letters/statements in annual reports serve as the raw data for our explanatory 
variable, the DoA in new CEOs' cognitive reasoning. We use mainstream computer-aided 
content analysis software DICTION 5.0 (Hart, 2000) to extract this variable. 
Most researchers study the intuition-analysis dimension of cognitive reasoning by 
looking at the attribution of intuitive decision (Blume and Covin, 2011) or the preference 
of intuition (Allinson and Hayes, 1996). They mainly use self-report approaches such as 
surveys and interviews. Other methods such as "think aloud" (Hamm, 1988) and "verbal 
102 
protocol" (Ericsson and Simon, 1980) allow participants to verbalize their thoughts. 
However, these obtrusive methods face the problems of social desirability (Podsakoff et 
aI., 2003. Kiesler and Drasgow, 1999) and retrospective bias (Miller et aI., 1997) because 
subjects often respond to questions with what the researchers want to hear and the 
respondents might not be able to remember the correct answers. The purposeful "think 
aloud" method will hamper individuals in articulating their subconscious intuition (Huang 
and Souitaris, 2009). Therefore, we call for unobtrusive methods to overcome the above-
mentioned drawbacks. 
One of the pioneer studies using content analysis to measure the DoA is the Noel 
and Erskine (2013) study on students' journals in an entrepreneurship simulation. To 
measure the individuals' analytical orientation, the repeated use of cognition-related words 
in the written logs signifies an emphasis on analytical thinking. The CAT A method can 
help us capture cognitive data "in the moment" as it reduces the problems of retrospective 
bias (Miller et aI., 1997), social desirability (Spector, 2006, Fisher, 2000) and other 
difficulties inherited from obtrusive approaches (Webb and Weick, 1979). 
The DoA in CEO's cognitive continuum: In this research, we measure new 
CEOs' reasoning using one of DICTION 5.0's 35 built-in dictionaries, the "cognitive 
terms" (Short and Palmer, 2008, Hart, 2000). Words in this category represent cerebral 
processes (Hart, 200 I); exemplary sub-categories and vocabulary include rationalistic 
(estimate. examine. reasonable) and calculative (diagnose, analyze, inference), modes of 
discovery (deliberate, compare, contrast) and so on. The DICTION score here represents 
the DoA: the more frequently a CEO uses these terms in his/her shareholder letters, the 
higher the score of DoA he/she will have. In contrast, the lower the score he/she has, the 
lower the DoA of hislher reasoning. This method has the advantages of a stable coding 
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scheme, explicit coding rules, high reliability, ease of use and the ability to deal with large 
volumes of data at low cost (Morris, 1994). 
5.5. Data analysis 
5.5.1. Analytical procedures 
We attempt to test our hypothesis for the cash holding using a dynamic panel data 
(DPD) analysis approach. Panel data analysis makes it possible to model dynamic 
processes with micro data (Bond, 2002). We assume that firms are pursuing a target cash 
level while making cash holding decisions (Garcia-Ternel and Martinez-Solano, 2008, 
Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) and it is a partial adjustment process. The cash holding level 
achieved at any time will also be explained by.the decisions taken in the prior periods. We 
follow the procedures adopted by previous empirical studies (Garcia-Ternel and Martinez-
Solano, 2008, Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004); we believe that the optimal cash level 
CASH *i.t is given by the particular characteristics of a firm plus a random disturbance as: 
(1) 
Firms will adjust theirs cash holding levels to achieve this optimal level CASH *i,t . (i is 
the individual effects dummies, and Ot is the time effects dummies. As such, any changes 
occurring will be determined by: 
CASHi,t - CASHt•t - 1 = y( CASH *i,t- CASHi•t _ 1 ) (2) 
(CASH *I.t- CASHt.t_1) is the required adjustment to reach the optimal level; y, 
the coefficient value is between 0 and 1. It represent a firm's capacity to achieve the 
desired level. Ify = 1, the firms are able to modify their cash levels to the optimal level 
immediately; ify = 0 , it means that the cost of adjustment is huge and firms are no 
longer able to adjust their existing cash levels. Substituting (1) for (2), the equation 
explaining the cash holding levels are transformed as: 
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(3) 
60 is 1 minus the adjustment coefficient y. The variable T/i acts as the unobservable 
heterogeneity to measure the particular characteristics of each firm and each CEO, as well 
as the characteristics of the industry in which the company serves. The parameters At are 
time dummy variables; this represents the same macro-environment impact on all the 
firms in each of the time periods. By considering these individual effects and time effects, 
we are able to capture the factors that firms cannot control and which may influence their 
cash decisions. 
The lagged dependent variable, the cash holding level one year before, is an 
important explanatory variable in a OPO model.22 Since the lagged dependent variable 
works as an explanatory variable, DPO analysis has to face the challenge of 
autocorrelation. Estimations in static modeling methods lose their consistency (Baltagi, 
2008). Since CASHi,t-l is correlated withT/i' even if Et,t is not serially correlated, these 
factors make the Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation for equation (3) inconsistent. 
Using the intragroup estimators, variables in the equation (3) are transformed into 
deviations from the mean and are also inconsistent because of the correlation between 
{CASHI,t-t - CASHi,t-d and Et,t - E1,t • General method of moment (GMM) is better 
than OLS because OLS omits the historical trend of the variables (Greene, 2003). DPO 
analysis is suitable for a small "T" and bigger "N" situation (Roodman, 2009a). A DPO 
model is suitable for our study because it can internally generate some instruments; all 
variables (including lagged and differenced variables) in regressions are assumed not to 
correlate with error term. 
22 For more detail on the importance of the lagged dependent variable, please refer to Appendix 3 
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Bond and Windmeijer (2002) comment that difference GMM can overcome the 
problems of the endogenity of independent variables and the heteroscedasticity of 
residuals. However, it can also lose some information, particularly with a small sample 
size. System GMM is better than difference GMM in situations where the series are close 
to being random works (Baum, 2006). The forward orthogonal deviations transformation 
in system GMM performs better by introducing more instruments. System GMM brings 
into consideration a level equation: using lagged differenced variables as instruments for 
variables in level equation. System GMM has a much smaller finite sample bias and much 
greater precision when estimating autoregressive parameters using persistent series (Bond, 
2002). We can use the first differenced variables as instruments for the equation in levels 
in a stacked system of equations that includes the equations in both levels and differences 
(Wintoki et aI., 2012). 
5.5.2. Descriptive analysis (statistical description and univariate comparisons) 
The number of directors on the board in the sampled firms ranges from 2 to 9 and 
the average is 3.97. These companies had 22,596 employees on average. Table 5.9 shows 
the means, standard deviations and the pairwise correlations among the variables for the 
observations based on the final dynamic model regression. The average cash to assets ratio 
(cash holding level) is 10.64% in the pooled data. As shown, cash holding level 
significantly correlated with the majority of explanatory variables. In accordance with the 
assumptions from prior studies and the developed hypothesis, cash holding level is 
significantly and positively correlated with quick ratio, short-term to total debt, dynamic 
of external environment and DoA. It significantly and negatively correlated with firm size, 
leverage. capital intensiveness and BoD size. No serious multicollinearity problem has 
been detected so far since no correlation of two or more predictors is greater than 0.4. 
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Table 5.9: Statistical description and correlation 
-------- ._--------
._._._._ .. _._._. __ ._._._._. __ . _._ ~~r!_e.I.!l.t.!~.!'._ _ _____ _______ ____ __ . _____ . _____ _________ __ _______ _ • 
Variables Mean Sld.Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1\ 12 
I.Cashl 10.64 10.12 I 
2.Finn size 8.762 1.541 -U_14* I 
3.Growth trend 8.772 20.26 -<J.OS 0.08 I 
4.Cash flow 7.354 17.24 -<J.08 0.15* 0.23* I 
5.Leverage 23.30 16.09 -U.24* 0.22* -0.01 0.08 I 
6.Quick ratio 1.001 0.706 0.37* -0.21* 0.03 -<J.04 -0.21* I 
7.Dividend 
ratio 4.202 25 .87 -0_03 0.05 -0.01 0.09 0.32* -0.07 I 
8.Capital 
Intensive 105.6 70.22 -0.10* -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.19* 0.19* -0.01 I 
-
9.Short tenn 
To total debt 34.67 34.88 0.30* -0.28* -0.05 -0.11* -0.37* -0.07 -0.04 -0.24* I 
10. CEO 
Ownership 53.67 21.12 0_05 -0.18* -0.14* -0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.08 0.10* I 
---
II . BoD size 3.966 1.499 -0_10* 0.23* -0.07 0 0 -0.11* 0.1 -0.07 -0.04 -0.36* I 




Dynamic 11.70 83. 18 0.11 * -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 0.38* -0.04 0.14* -0.05 -0.01 0.06 0.Q2 
Notes: pooled data; with n == 382, Ho: Pi,j=O HI: Pi.j *0, * represents those correlations that are significant at p < .05; please find information in Table 5.8. for 
detailed explanation of each variable; as showed in bold, we can identify the correlation relationships between the cash holding level and predictor variables. 
The highlighted result demonstrates a significant positive correlation between DoA and the cash holding level. 
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At this stage. we adopt a univariate approach, quartile analysis, as showed in Table 
5.10, which has been widely used by cash holding researchers (Opler et aI., 1999), 
(Ferreira and Vilela. 2004, Garcia-Ternel and Martinez-Solano, 2008). This method helps 
us to detect whether there are any significant differences in variables studied between the 
characteristics of the firms and CEOs in relation to their cash holding level. The cash to 
assets (cash holding level) quartiles are constructed each year, which explains why ranges 
of the cash-to-assets overlap across quartiles. We examine whether the characteristics of 
companies and CEOs holding a high cash level (firms in the fourth quartile, Q4th) differ 
from those with a low cash holding level in the first quartile (QIst). We carried out a 
difference in mean value test for observations in quartile 1 and quartile 4 based on 
Student's t-test to judge if the mean values of the fourth quartile are significantly different 
from those of the first quartile. 
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Table 5.10: Characteristics of firms and new (EOs' OoA by cash holding level quartiles 
t-
Q1th Q2th Q3th Q4th value(p) 
Min 
° 
3.210 6.321 12.17 
Max 6.180 9.544 19.75 83.44 
Environment 
k'57 DXnamic -4.206 -0.230 1.031 t6.~n -- - -(Median] -0.619 0.448 2.022 -0.162 




923 18,783 17.790 1 (-) (Median] 18.345 8.776 8.690 8.015 0.006 




402 16,080 111 .35 I 0.189 (Median] ! 6.575 6.693 4.812 7.580 





84 -12~93- t1~2.- ~~:ooo --(Median] 125.13 24.18 22.69 6.583 






969 11.845 I (+) (Median] ! 0.697 0.882 0.912 1.233 0.000 
Dividend ratio J2.~1 
··1 ~::~ ·····1 ~-:~: l~:~ 10.561 (Median] ! 1.912 
C~tal intensive J2~.() I !~~~6 _11~~).1 1 23I,6 . 10.752 (Median] ! 113.4 80.03 85.99 
Short term to 
Total debt 26.69 28.59 29.81 148,11 (+) 
(Median] 14.29 18 18.98 39.40 0.000 
CEO ownersh~ J 52.1.~ 
1 ~~:~~ ··1 :~~:~ l ~~:~: . I (+) . (Median] ! 47.39 0.022 
BoD size J 4.284 1 :.208 
.1 !.~3 I ~.575 I (-) (Median] !4 0.000 
DcA 15.4~ _/§.:16L -j 6J?02_ 17.Q?0 _ IJ+L ~R_ . 
LMedianj 5.335 5.460 5.740 6.880 0.000 
Notes: Univariate comparison of means and medians of firm characteristics 
and new CEOs' DoA in cognition reasoning of 893 firm year observations for 
those FTSE All-Share companies that a new CEO took up his/her post from 
2002 to 2007. The number of observations in each quartile (Q1 = 220, Q2 = 
224, Q3 =227, Q4 =222). From Q1st to Q4th column, the values in the same 
row with the variable names are the means for each variable in the quartiles; 
below, the values In the same row with [Median] are the medians of each 
variable in the quartiles. Ho: mean of Q4 = mean of Q1, H1: mean of Q4 ~ 
mean of Q1; the numbers in the last column are the p-values for the Student's 
t tests. 8y looking at the quartile comparison between Q4 and Q1 only, (+) 
represents a positive relationship and (-) represents a negative relationship 
between the explanatory variables and cash holding level. These relationships 
have been disclosed In the quartile analysis. 
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In general. some characteristics of the firms and CEOs holding more cash (in the 
4th quartile) are significantly different from those with lower cash holdings (in the 1st 
quartile). As shown in the table, in a positive way, firms with a higher quick ratio, a bigger 
short-term proportion of debt, bigger CEO ownership and CEOs who have higher DoA 
will hold more cash. In contrast, firms which are a larger size, have higher fmancial 
leverage and a greater number of BoD memberships will hold less cash. However, other 
variables such as environment dynamic, firm growth potential, cash flow ratio, dividend 
ratio. and capital intensity do not show their impact significantly or monotonically on cash 
holdings as expected in prior literature. This is possibly due to our observations being 
drawn from the CEO succession context. Also, the joint effects of multiple variables are 
different from the effect of a single variable individually on cash holding levels. Only 
comparing the I st and the 4th quartiles may not be sufficient to disclose the relationships 
between variables at different levels and cash holding. Hence, we carry on the multivariate 
analysis below. 
5.5.3. Multivariate analysis 
To make our findings more robust, we manipulate our regressions for hypothesis 
testing under various settings and scenarios. Table 5.11 summarizes the results of 8 
different models from different settings which allow us to compare them across the 
columns. The dependent variable Cash 1 is explained by different models with all the prior 
recognized important control variables, using different estimations, with or without the 
explanatory variable, the DoA ofCEOs' cognitive reasoning. The impacts of Do A will be 
demonstrated via an examination of these different models. 
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Table 5.11: Firms' cash holding level under different estimations and models 
DV:eash1 (1 ) (21 1~ (4) (5) (6) (7) 18) 
Firm size 0.522+ -0.0380 0.518+ -0.594 r-Q,40~~ -0.668 1.174 1.668 t----.. -
(0.311 ) (1.830) (OJ12.1 ~1~77?L U9·20~ (1.794) (1.661 ) (1.85ID 
Growth trend -0.025 -0.017 -0.025 -0.008 -0.010 -0.004 -0.050 -0.020 
.. 
(0.024) (0.015) (0.02~1 ~Q_~01~L ~.IL 
. .. 
(Q.015) (0.031) (0.03ID 
Cash flow -0.021 0.019 -0.022 0.014 -0.026 0.010 -0.036 -0.044 
- _ .. - --- t-..... - .. - f-----. 
(Q.028>. JO:Q.151 _(0.029) (0.014) (0.022) (Q:O!.?) _ 10.0591 (0.05~ 
Leverage -0.014 0.110 -0.011 0.088 ~,03~_ 0.084 -0.027 -O--,-OO.§ r-···-·----(0.036) (0.069) (0-,-()361 ~Q~O~L (0.024) (0.067) JO.096) (Q,08D 
Quick ratio 7.375·* 9.158*· 7.176*· 8.602** 3.510** 8.624** 2.593+ 2.573* 
--- 8:1:.748) (1.443) (1.815) (1A2Ql (0.743) (1-69~) (1.534) (L04Q) 
- - -
Dividend rate 0.008 0.011*· 0.009 -0.009* 0.019** 0.010** -0.011 ().O~~_ 1-'- . .. (0.008) (0.004) (0,.908J ~JPJ)()41 (O.OO§L (Q.004) 10.0441 (Q,04.~ 
Capital - -
intensive 0.017** -O:Q.14_ 0.016** -0.011 -0.009* -0.009 -0.009 -0.003 
- -(0.006) (0.016) (0,906.1 ~()~01~L lJQ·OQ4L (0.015) (0.020) (Q,01§) 
Short term 
To total debt 0.089·* 0.095** 0.089** 0.097** 0.035** 0.098** -0.012 0.020_. r--='-'--.. 
(0.012) .' (0.017) (0.022) (0.01~ U-Q .. 02.?L (Q.O??) .10.0401 (0.Q4ID 
CEO ownership -0.001 0.037* -0.005 0.039* ~6_ 0.040* -0.001 -0.005 t--.----
10.078) (0.025) (0.017) (0.,926.1 ~().01?L lJ9..01~ «().017) (Q~07JJ 
BoD size -0.656+ 0.0356 -0.580+ 0.125 -0.215 0.108 -0.614 -0.737 _. 
(0.341) (0.299) (o.~Ql U-(P8~L ~~ (0.293) (0.773) (O-,~OD 
Environment - - -
dynamiC -0.011+ 0.009** -0.011+ 0.009** -0.006+ 0.009** ri!-,003 -0.001 - ... _- "--- t-=-----1-------(0.006) (0.003) (O.OO6J ~O~OO~L UO.OO~ (0.003) (0.005) (Q,pOm 
0.595* 
DcA 0.298* 0.260* .Jh1L~ 0.266* * t-=-.. --- 1---- --- -_ ... (0,_14~1 0.12QL Q.09~ (0.121 ) (Q,~2.1J 
0.693* 0.703* 
L.eash1 0.727** 0.068+ * * 
-- -- r---- 1-'------ r----- --.. -.-
- . - -
. . - .. - - - - - _. - - -. -. - -
-._ .. _ .. _. __ .. _-
._"-'---'-'-_ . 
L().:.CM§L. tQJ)E) ... .to.,()~~L _(Q.J.Q()J. 
N 384 384 382 382 382 382 384 382 
Adi R2 0.328 0.343 0.341 0.367 0.718 0.391 
ar1p 0.001 0.000 
ar2p 0.857 0.990 
hansen df 43 45 
hansenp 0.714 0.765 
Notes; Standard errors In parentheses; + p<0.1, * p<0.05, •• p<0.01; the Intercepts, time dummies 
have been omitted form the table. ar1p is the p value of AR(!) statistic; hansen_df is the degrees 
of freedom for Hansen statistiC; hansenp is the p value of Hansen statistic. 
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In the table above, there are 8 different models which help us to understand the 
effects of DcA on cash holding. Model (1) is a regression model with only control 
variables using the OLS estimators. Model (2) is a fixed effects (FE) model with only 
control variables. Model (3) and Model (4), respectively, are an OLS regression model 
and an FE model, including the DoA and all the control variables. Models (5) and (6) are 
an OLS and an FE model with all the control variables, explanatory variable and lagged 
dependent variable. Models (7) and (8) are dynamic models using the system generalized 
methods of moment (SGMM) estimators. Model (8) contains all the variables; Model (7) 
includes all the control variables and the lagged dependent variable but not the DoA. 
Models (I). (2). (3) and (4) are static models which do not include the lagged dependent 
variable. Models (5), (6), (7) and (8) are dynamic models which take L.cashl into 
consideration. Models ( I), (2) and (7) do not include DoA and the remaining models take 
this into account as the focal predictor for firms' cash holding level. Model (8) is the final 
model. previously presented in the equation (3). 
The System Generalized Methods of Moment (SGMM) models 
The dynamic Models (7) and (8) apply the GMM dynamic estimation which was 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Different from 
the OLS estimation. the SGMM does not require the normality assumptions and allows a 
certain degree of heteroskedasticity in the data. The robust Hansen J-tests were applied in 
the two-step estimation process. Based on the available data, we have 382 observations in 
the final model. The small sample raises the downward bias of estimated asymptotic 
standard errors in the two-step procedure (Baltagi, 2008). We select the "Windmeijer 
correction" (Windmeijer. 2005) using the STATA "small" option to report the corrected 
results. 
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The autocorrelation of disturbance terms shows whether or not the applied 
instruments in the model are exogenous. Our results demonstrate the appropriateness of 
these autocorrelation assumptions. There is only first order serial autocorrelation and no 
stage 2 serial autocorrelation of residuals (ar2p is 0.857 in model (7) and ar2p is 0.990 in 
model (8». 
The Hansen l-statistical tests (Baum, 2006) examine the correctness of model 
specification and valid over-identifying restrictions; i.e. all instruments are exogenous. 
The reported p value is 0.714 for the base Model (7) and has been increased to 0.765 for 
the final Model (8). This provides some evidence that including our focal constructs can 
improve the quality of our model. To test the validity of the subsets of instruments (i.~. 
levels. differenced and standard IV), xtabond2 provides a difference-in SarganiHensen test, 
also known as the C-test (Baum, 2006). This test compares the system GMM with and 
without a subset of suspect instruments; the validity (exogeneity) of any subset of 
instruments and their contributions toward the increase in l-statistics (Roodman, 2009a). 
All the p-values of these statistical tests have been increased from the Model (7) to the 
final Model (8). which gives us confidence about the additional explanatory power of our 
explanatory variable. DoA. 
For both models, (7) and (8), to cope with the problem of instrument proliferation 
(Roodman. 2006). we use the "collapse" option of xtabond2 which creates one instrument 
fOf each variable and lag distance, rather than one for each time period, variable and lag 
distance. It effectively constrains all the yearly moment conditions as the same (Wintoki et 
at.. 2012). 
Both estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variable in Model (7) and 
Model (8) are less than one absolute unity (Roodman, 2009b), which indicate the "steady 
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state" of our model assumption. Further evidence of the validity of our dynamic panel 
models is the comparison among the estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent 
variables (Bond, 2002). For L.Cashl, OLS estimated coefficient 0.727 in Model (5) is 
bigger than GMM estimated coefficient 0.703 in Model (8), and GMM estimated 
coefficient is bigger than FE estimated coefficient 0.068 in Model (6). These results 
demonstrate the validity of the final GMM Model (8) according to Bond's criteria. 
The F-tests for joint significances both (p=O.OOO in both Model (7) and (8» reject 
that the explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero; this result also provides support for 
the validity/appropriateness of both models. 
The interpretation and comparison across models 
Our focal explanatory variable, the DoA of CEOs' cognitive reasoning, 
demonstrates its effects on cash holding levels toward the same direction consistently and 
significantly across all the models, no matter whether the static Models (3) and (4) or in 
the dynamic Models (5) (6) and (8). These results fit with the predicted relationship in the 
hypothesis development section: there is a positive relationship between DoA and cash 
holding; an increased DoA score will lead to the increase in cash holding. The coefficients 
of DoA range from .170 to .595; the results of significant coefficient tests are at p <.05 
level and in the final model, it is at p <.01 level. Therefore, the hypothesized relationships 
are supported throughout. 
The results demonstrated two interesting facts: while using the same estimation 
methods, ceteris-paribus, dynamic models with the lagged dependent variable as a 
predictor have better explanation powers than those static models. As shown, we can 
compare Model (3) with Model (5), and Model (4) with Model (6) by adding the lagged 
dependent variable, R2 increases from .341 to .718 and from .367 to .391, respectively. 
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Ceteris-paribus, adding DoA into the models will increase the explanatory powers and the 
fitness of model as well. For the second fact, by comparing Model (1) with (3) and Model 
. (2) with (4), R2 has increased from .328 to .341 and from .343 to .367, respectively. This 
evidence unveils the importance of including DoA to explain the dependent variable even 
in the static models. Also, when comparing Model (7) and (8), the p-value of the Hansen-J 
test of over-identifying restrictions has increased from .714 to .765, which illustrates a 
better model. 
Across our models, the expected importance and significance of two control 
variables did not appear across all of them, i.e. the growth tendency of the firms, the cash 
flow ratio. This might be due to the CEO succession context, under a dynamic 
environment. The influences of the growth potential and cash flow ratio have complicated 
implications for the firms. It contradicts prior studies and needs to be further investigated 
under a similar context. One of the most imponant explanatory variables in our models is 
the quick ratio which is important across all eight models. The financial health of a firm 
plays a crucial role here. The relationship of quick ratio and cash holding is positive. 
Generally speaking, firms' financial status influences the cash holding level as we can see 
from the magnitude and significance of coefficients of quick ratio across different models. 
This implies that the financially unconstrained firms have more capability to retain cash 
on hand. Dividend ratios have a small and negative but significant impact on cash holding 
levels in Models (2), (4), (5) and (6). Capital intensity has a small negative but significant 
impact on cash holding levels in Models (1), (3) and (5). Reducing dividend payout can 
help firms increase their cash on hand, and capital intensity might bum out firms' cash on 
hand. The negative influences of board size on cash holding only appear significant in 
static Models (1) and (3). CEO ownerships have positive significant relationships on cash 
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holding in Models (2), (4) and (6). These corporate governance factors lose the 
significance of their impacts on cash holding while using advanced dynamic methods. 
Environment dynamic, measured as the industry growth trend, has negative but small 
significant effects on cash holding level. Short-tenn to total debt ratio has positive and 
significant effects on the cash holding level. However, their importance disappears in the 
dynamic models using the system GMM estimations. 
We have also conducted three types of robustness check: 1) while selecting 
instrumental variables for the final dynamic SGMM Model (8), the explanatory variable, 
DoA and other control variables have been set as predetennined variables; 2) using 
alternative measurements for variables such as cash holding level, finn size, quick ratio 
and CEO ownership etcetera in all eight models; 3) taking out those explanatory variables 
with insignificant regression coefficient (~) test results, i.e. growth trend, cash flow ratio 
and leverage and then rerun the 8 models. The above results remain similar; the significant 
and positive relationships between DoA and cash holding level have been con finned 
under different settings. For the scope of this paper, we do not report the detail of 
robustness tests here. 
To sum up the discussion, the hypothesis is supported by the evidence above 
across different models. A high DoA of CEOs' cognitive reasoning will increase finns' 
cash holding level. A low DoA in the cognitive continuum will decrease finns' cash 
holding level. 
5.6. Discussions and conclusions 
Building on the CCT, this study intends to provide additional explanations on top 
of current theories in cash holding because the extant ones are mainly based on rational 
economic assumptions, unlike the traditional upper echelon theory and bounded rationality 
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which mainly adopt demographic proxies. We examined the subjective importance of 
CEOs by borrowing a novel psycholinguistic approach to measure the DoA in CEOs' 
cognitive continuum directly. This extends the recent developing stream of behavior 
finance that departs from rational economic reasoning (Subrahmanyam, 2008). We 
advocate that CEOs' cognitive reasoning offers a new tradeoff angle for cash holding 
researchers. 
I integrate the analytic-intuitive cognition spectrum by taking into account the 
DoA, as a construct for bringing behavioral science into traditional cash holding models. 
Using a partial adjustment dynamic approach in a longitudinal dataset, this study suggests 
that the DoA may increase the estimated transactional costs of raising funds, enhance 
uncertainty avoidance activities, diminish fast-moving competitive advantages, and 
increase the related opportunity costs. It makes the CEOs more precautionary and more 
risk adverse. Consequently, it raises the cash holding levels. 
This study also has practical implications for shareholders and investors in the 
market. It provides an opportunity for them to appreciate the cognitive reasoning that 
CEOs invoke. It encourages CEOs to adopt different DoA to carry out reasoning and 
information processing. Bringing down the finns' cash holding levels by suggesting that 
CEOs adopt a low DoA will be a novel and useful attempt. Furthermore, intuition, with a 
low DoA, can be acquired in the course of education (Sadler-Smith and Shefy, 2007). It 
thus provides educators and policy-makers a new avenue to explore to find solutions to the 
cash holding problems. 
I believe this study to be the first to attempt to adopt the psycholinguistic approach 
and focus on the DoA in CEOs' cognitive continuum to study cash holding policies. The 
findings demonstrate the importance of DoA and the evidence of our claims under 
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different estimations and with alternative measurements is very robust. This study could 
be an important complement to the current economic theories of cash holding; new CEOs' 
cognitive reasoning offers additional explanations to cash holding levels in a leadership 
succession context. The psychology of CEOs plays a vital role for firms' strategies and 
policies. The DoA can be further examined in studying other financial strategies in future 
studies. 
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Chapter 6: Concluding remarks and reflections 
This thesis sought to join the conversation on top executive research by adding on 
those widely neglected "hot & soft" psychological elements of CEOs. In a CEO 
succession context, this thesis asked "why" (antecedences) and "so what" (consequences) 
questions. To pursue the answers, the research comprised three independent empirical 
studies on 1) CEO turnover types, 2) PSSC, and 3) cash holding policy, with CEOs' 
psychological factors such as cognition and emotion being the main themes throughout. 
Succession events in the FTSE All-Share Index were picked according to some selection 
criteria in a six-year timeframe from 2002 to 2007. Other useful data such as company 
news and annual reports were collected surrounding these events. To understand the 
related organizational phenomenon in a CEO transition better, I investigated its 
antecedences and consequences by taking advantage of the psycho linguistic approach and 
content analysis techniques. These methods enabled us to explore some areas not yet 
penetrated in the existing literature. 
In the previous chapters, the majority of the hypotheses developed by each essay 
were supported but not all the prior recognized relationships were congruent with previous 
studies. Empirical results produced both expected and unexpected outcomes which are 
worthwhile thinking about here. 
This final chapter first highlights and draws a comparison with the main findings 
of this research. Second, it summarizes the novelties of the presented studies, the 
contributions to the research fields. Then, it moves on to discuss the practical implications 
for policymakers and managers, the limitations of this research. Last but not least, it 
provides some reflections on this study. Figure 6.2 illustrates the main points of this final 
chapter as below: 
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Figure 6.2: A reflection on three empirical studies 
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!Psychological factors of CEOs do matter; Extension to other subjects in management 
!studies 
6.1. Main findings and comparisons 
The three essays are independent of each other; they are different in the objects of 
study, dependent variables, theoretical frameworks, analytic methods and so on. However, 
they are interlinked with each other as in a drama series. 
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Essay one found that the likelihood of the CEO involuntary turnover against the 
voluntary departure is influenced by old CEOs' FFA and NE. FFA increases the 
likelihood of CEO voluntary turnover; NE boosts the likelihood of CEO involuntary step-
down. 
Essay two discusses both the internal and external causes of PSCC. It discovers 
that internal psychological factors, for example, both FF A and C2C of new CEOs, will 
increase the degrees ofPSSC variation; and their NE will decrease it. 
The third essay explores the relationships between new CEOs' cognitive 
approaches and the partial adjustment outcomes of cash holding level. This research 
provides empirical evidence that DoA is important for new CEOs to determine the cash 
holding level for their firms. DoA is another mechanism impacting the transaction cost 
and opportunity cost calculation. The high DoA will increase a firm's cash holding level 
and a low DoA will decrease it. 
Although the object of study in essay one is the old CEOs and the study objects in 
essays two and three are the new CEOs, we can perceive that no matter whether 
predecessors or successors, CEOs' psychological factors are very important for their 
decisions not only for the companies and but also for themselves. Leaders' psychological 
factors do matter in the CEO transition period; the empirical results show that they can 
increase the explanatory power of our models and may absorb the effects of other 
important variables as recognized in prior literature [for example, performance variables 
in essays 1 and 2, making them less significant (a potential mediation effect) after taking 
account of the focal independent variables]. Other interesting phenomena such as CEOs' 
power and organizational inertia have also been discovered in the results. While 
comparing the insights from essays one and two, I identify some general favorable effects 
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of FFA and general adverse influences of NE towards the results for executives' career 
management and for the finns' strategic activities. 
6.2. Novelties and contributions 
This research adopted some novel approaches and perspectives to understand the 
CEO succession and other relevant organizational phenomena better. The main 
contribution is the illumination of the importance of leaders' psychological factors in 
strategic management. The subjective constructs were measured directly using content 
analysis techniques rather than using demographic proxies. 
6.2.1. Novelties 
According to its definition, whether an old CEO's turnover is involuntary or 
voluntary depends on hislher own will. However, incumbents' wills have been broadly 
ignored in the existinR literature. Essay one started by considering the proactive roles of 
incumbents. It reinforced the importance of the incumbents' role in the selection of 
succession types. The research not only emphasized the incumbents' cognition element, 
i.e. FF A, but also emphasized the emotional factor, i.e. NE. 
Different from previous studies which mainly concentrate on comparing the 
differences between predecessors and successors, the second essay looked at intra-
individual (time-varying) differences. It applied variation measures for PSSC. 
Additionally, it developed a novel measurement to gauge C2C; it controlled unobserved 
heterogeneity by tracing the same new CEOs longitudinally in the panel data analysis. 
Essay three appreciated DoA as an important indicator and bridging construct in 
behavior science; it demonstrates the influences of new CEOs' cognitive approaches in the 
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way they employed for cash holding decisions. The research tested the effects of 
independent variable in both static and dynamic models under different scenarios. 
6.2.2. Contributions 
The first essay contributed to CEO succession literature by first taking account of 
the executive career management perspective. It applied a dual analysis covering both 
cognitive and emotional elements. Empirical results showed that the research has 
significantly increased the explanatory power compared with previous studies. 
Essay two takes an integrated and holistic view to illuminate the importance of the 
psychological trilogy of new CEOs for PSSC. Methodologically, it produced an example 
tracing the same objects of study longitudinally. An integrated perspective can achieve 
better explanations for the PSSC than using each of single factor solely. 
The third essay will be one of the early studies on cash holding in a CEO 
succession context. It contributed to behavioral finance research by considering the DoA 
in CEOs' cognitive approaches of the judgment process. It complemented current "hard 
and cold" rationale economic theories and provided a better explanation for the cash 
holding strategy. 
6.3. Limitations and future studies 
Each essay identifies its shortcomings and future research direction in each chapter, 
respectively. There are some general limitations originating from the coding method for 
raw data analysis, for example, the appropriateness of using CEOs' shareholder letters to 
distill the independent variables, CEOs' psychological factors; some focal construct 
measurements rely on predefined dictionaries built in the computer-aided content analysis 
software. All the data used in this thesis are generated from archival sources rather than 
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primary data from direct observations. Therefore, some of the responsibilities of validity 
and reliability issues rely on other people's hands. 
Yet, I think of the unobtrusive method as an advantage rather than a drawback 
because it helps us to avoid the psychological reactions that other inquiry methods might 
cause. All these issues need to be further justified to increase the generalizability of our 
findings. These studies will also face some challenges inherited from a variance model 
approach. Other limitations that raise our concerns include relatively small sample sizes 
and small T (times of observation) due to the data availability problems. 
Essay one can be extended if we have the time and resources to collect more 
shareholder letters from those non-succession cases and a multinomial logit model could 
be applied in that setting. However, this would tremendously increase the workload of this 
research study. 
Following essay two, more studies, for example by using different intervals of time 
scale (quarter, month), extending the research to other geographic territories, exploring the 
potential mediation roles of psychological Jactors can further develop the research into the 
next stage. Other than using the resource allocation profile as a proxy to calculate strategic 
changes, we can extend the second essay by using other change indicators, for example, 
using market scope, operation scope, service/product quality, cost efficiency and so on, 
recommended by Cho and Hambrick (2006). We can examine another dimension of 
strategic changes, speed reflecting how quickly the strategic change take place. Strategic 
change speed brings the firm early competitive advantages and organizations need to 
change rapidly to cope with the immediate and drastic challenges from the environment ; 
(Forbes, 2005). 
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Similar approaches and the ideas from essay three can also be applied to 
investigate other financial phenomena such as capital structure, investment strategies and 
soon. 
Since the raw data of CEO shareholder letters and company news are generic data 
sources, they can be reused (data mining) for other research topics and other interesting 
constructs such as market orientation, entrepreneurial orientation, external corporate 
governance mechanism and so on. Furthermore, it will be interesting if the research 
approaches, focal constructs, concepts of this thesis, are applied to other management 
studies. Considering the complexity of psychological factors and processes, the cross 
levels effects underlying the observed phenomena, our abstract knowledge and simplified 
e ~ ~~f~J1iJrpJttA~ t-Dm~~~f~J1iJrpJm~ .t,. ~e ~D i1*m .... IiII¥Z:II'~ 
of research on similar themes. Surveys, qualitative interviews, case studies, ethnography, 
action research and so on might deepen our understanding in these topics. 
However, I am aware of the difficulties to get access to the organizations and 
CEOs. It would be better if I have an internship opportunity in the executive consultant 
firms. Street smarts give researchers more insightful knowledge and information about 
their studies. 
6.4. Practical implications and reflections 
6.4.1. Practical implications 
This thesis can offer practitioners, for example, investors, BoDs, stakeholders, 
fund providers, employees, general public, policy makers, CEOs themselves and so on 
some interesting materials and can bring some thoughts to them. It can offer a 
comprehensive, simplified, abstract framework which assists us in our understanding of 
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why and how CEOs' make certain decisions and firms act in certain ways responding to 
the external environments. Despite their complexity and abstraction, I believe that 
cognition, emotion and conation can be potent constructs helping us to understand 
managers' decisions and organizational behaviors better. Rather than giving practitioners a 
precise instrument to gauge those important psychological issues, this research merely . 
intends to raise peoples' awareness in a modest way and concerns those subtle but 
significant effects of executives' psychology. 
Incorrectly interpreting these psychological signals can lead to some disaster 
consequences and misleading results. People should evaluate CEOs' emotions and 
cognition, which reveal much useful information and many hints. For example, by 
figuring out CEOs' emotions, subordinates might able to judge whether their leaders really 
want to make the moves for the strategic changes or not. For those people such as 
executive career development consultants, coaches and head hunters who are providing 
comments and advice for top managers, this study gives them an example using 
unobtrusive methods to collect and analyze information. The Chairman, BoDs, and other 
stakeholders can look at the psychological states of CEOs to appreciate the potential 
implications for their firms. 
For the top executives themselves, they should learn how to express, control and 
manage their emotions better; they should foster their emotional intelligence and their 
capability in this area. Also, they need to develop mutual understanding via the 
communication between CEOs and stakeholders. Evaluating the cognitive approaches 
adopted by CEOs offers us much interesting and useful information. Because of the 
general favorable outcomes ofFFA and general adverse implications ofNE, CEOs should 
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develop their skills to boost these positive elements in their mental functions and suppress 
those negative ones. 
Popular interest in CEO succession and top executive studies demonstrate a 
prevailing trend. However, little has been put into practice so far by considering the 
emotion, cognition and conation elements of CEOs together. This study brings in some 
fresh air for practitioners who normally pay attention to this concrete information such as 
CEOs' gender, education, qualification, skills, and so on. More practice should be 
encouraged to look at the emotion of the managers. 
I experienced some difficulties in collecting data for this study because in the UK, 
we do not have those aggregated databases which are popular and widely used in the USA. 
Information about the companies, the governance structure, and the CEOs are scattered 
around and this study has consumed much time, money, and manpower on collecting and 
processing the raw data. It would be better if the regulations in the UK required listed 
companies to report more discourse and text information to the public compulsorily. It 
would be very helpful if the industries were willing to make this information available to 
researchers more easily and with less cost, particularly for doctoral students. 
6.4.2. Some reflections 
As discussed in the prior sections, the importance of those "hot & soft" factors has 
been widely ignored in the management research. I acknowledge the instability and 
dynamic nature of human psychology. It is difficult to gauge the effects of CEOs' 
psychology across the levels from individuals to organizations (Bacharach, 1989). The 
influences from CEOs' minds to the organizational outcomes seem to be "a bit far away". 
I have faced criticism and challenges from other colleagues who have difficulties in 
believing the effects of CEOs' psychological factors on organizational activities. 
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However, there is much evidence supporting the suitability of our methodology. 
While studying relationships across boundaries of time, organizations 'and levels of 
analysis (Bacharach, 1989), content analysis is an appropriate approach to bridge the 
micro-macro gap and enhances the potential of theorizing (Sonpar and Golden-Biddle, 
2008). In studying the psychology of CEOs by using the content analysis of their letter to 
shareholders (Sonpar and Golden-Biddle, 2008), the problems of cross level effects can be 
alleviated in developing adolescent theories for organizations. 
I am fully aware of the preliminary and exploratory nature of this research. Hence, 
this thesis is more concerned about its explanatory power than its predictive power. 
Economic factors and human factors are congruent and complement each other. 
Researchers studying top executives' psychological factors should be rather humble about 
their findings and acknowledge the less deterministic effects of psychological factors in 
explaining organizational phenomena. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: The FTSE index family tree 
rnt AI 5 .. 1 _I· 
Sources: FTSE All-Share Index Factsheet, 
https:/Iwww.ftse.com/lndices/UK Indices/Downloads/FTSE All-Share Index Factsheet.pdf 
[accessed on 01/06/2012] 
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Appendix 2: The properties of intuitive and analytic cognition 
The table below demonstrates the properties associated with intuition and analysis, as two 
extreme poles in the cognitive continuum. 
Table: Characteristics of cognitive continuum: Intuition and Analysis 
Characteristics Intuitive cognition Analytical cognition 
Area of brain activity Mostly right hemisphere Mostly left hemisphere 
Decision consistency Low High 
Procedure Low High 
Awareness/conscious 
Effort Effortless/automatic Effortful/intentional 
Cognitive control Low High 
Speed of processing High Low 
Memory Little coding Complex coding 
Metaphors used Pictorial, qualitative Verbal, quantitative 
Information used Flexible Consistent 
Confidences in judgments Low High 
Errors in judgment Normally distributed Non-normally distributed 
Notes: Developed from (Dunwoody et aI., 2000), (Doherty and Kurz, 1996) and (Dhami and Thomson, 2013) 
Intuition cognition nonnally take places in the right hemisphere of the human brain. In an 
intuitive cognition mode, the individuals' cognitive control is low and the infonnation processing 
is effortless. The consistency and reliability of the infonnation processing results are low. 
Individuals have low awareness of their cognitive activities; however, the speed of their cognitive 
activities is high. Memory has little encoding. The metaphors used in this mode are vivid pictorial 
and qualitative. Infonnation used is flexible, confidence in judgment is low, and the error of 
judgment is nonnally distributed. 
In contrast, analytic cognition mostly happens in the left hemisphere of the human brain. 
Under an analytic cognition mode, individuals have strong control over the process and they put 
much effort into it. The results of infonnation processing have high consistency and reliability. It 
is high in awarenesS of cognitive activity. The cognitive activity is at low speed. It demands 
complex coding and it prefers to use verbal and numerical data. The infonnation used is consistent; 
the confidence of the judgment is high. The error in judgment is non-nonnally distributed. 
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Appendix 3: The importance of lagged dependent variable 
If we ignore individual characteristics, only using lagged dependent variable as predictor 
in the equation, we have the following results for the first different GMM estimation (a), the 
system GMM estimation (b), the OLS regression (c) and fixed effects (FE) model (d). The table 
below is a simplified illustration of the importance of lagged dependent variable. The lagged 
dependent variable plays a key role influencing the cash holding level since all the coefficient tests 
are highly significant. The OLS model (3) is able to receive a very high R2 = 0.696. As expected, 
according to the Bond (2002) dynamic model validation criteria, the coefficients of lagged 
dependent variable in GMM estimated dynamic models are between the value of estimated 
coefficients in OLS and FE models. System GMM estimation is better than first different GMM 
because the p value of Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions has been increased from 0.691 
to 0.796. 
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Standard errors in parentheses, +p<O.1, *P<0.05, **p<0.01 
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